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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 1996, Jeffery Lee Wood sat in a parked vehicle while his
accomplice robbed a convenience store and fatally shot the store clerk.1
After the shooting, Wood entered the store, helped remove the store's
cash box, safe, and videotape recorder,2 and then drove the getaway car.3
For his participation in that offense, Wood was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in March 1998.'
1. News Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex., Media Advisory: Jeffery Lee
Wood Scheduled for Execution (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
oagNews/release.php?id=2602 (describing the extent of Wood's participation in the fatal
shooting of a store clerk).
2. Id.
Shortly after 6 a.m. on January 2, 1996, Danny Reneau walked into a Texaco station
located near IH-10 in Kerrville and fatally shot store clerk Kriss Keeran with a .22
caliber pistol. Jeffery Lee Wood remained outside in a vehicle that Wood had bor-
rowed from his brother. However, after the shooting, Wood entered the convenience
store, and helped Reneau remove the store's safe, cash box, and the videotape re-
corder connected to the store's security camera. Id.
3. See Wood v. Quarterman, 572 F. Supp. 2d 814, 816 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (reciting how
Wood participated in and drove the getaway car for both armed robberies).
4. See id. ("It will suffice to note the evidence at petitioner's trial established peti-
tioner participated in a pair of armed robberies of convenience stores which culminated in
the fatal shooting of a store clerk by petitioner's accomplice .... "). See generally James C.
McKinley Jr., Federal Judge, Chastising the Texas Courts, Orders a Stay of Execution, N.Y.
TIMFs, Aug. 22, 2008, at A12 (reporting how Wood was convicted under a Texas law that
makes parties to a felony subject to the death penalty if one party commits murder during
the course of the offense). Wood did not murder the victim, rather it was his partner who
committed the crime. Id. Mr. Wood also had mental problems to the extent that certain
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On August 14, 2008, fewer than twenty days away before his scheduled
execution, Wood filed a motion in a Texas state court "requesting ap-
pointment of counsel and appointment of a mental health expert" to help
him investigate, develop, and present evidence regarding a claim that he
is incompetent to be executed.5 Wood based his request on two previous
U.S. Supreme Court decisions.' The first, Ford v. Wainwright,7 held that
it is unconstitutional to execute mentally ill defendants.8 The second,
Panetti v. Quarterman9 , held that once a capital defendant, who is seeking
a stay of execution, makes "a substantial threshold showing of insanity,"
the defendant must receive certain minimal due process protections.'
Those due process requirements include, but are not limited to, a right to
have an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to submit expert
evidence."
On August 21, 2008, within hours of his scheduled execution, Wood
obtained a stay when a federal judge determined that Texas courts had
deprived him of his right to assistance of a mental health professional and
court-appointed counsel.12 While never diagnosed with mental retarda-
courts considered him incompetent to stand trial. Id; See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02
(Vernon 1974) (holding a person criminally responsible for an offense committed by an-
other person if certain criteria apply).
5. Wood, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (stating the petitioner filed an untimely motion to the
state court). In that motion, petitioner requested "appointment of counsel and appoint-
ment of a mental health expert to assist petitioner in investigation, developing, and
presenting evidence supporting a claim that petitioner is currently incompetent to be exe-
cuted and, thereby, at least temporarily exempt from the death penalty .... " Id.
6. Id. (stating the petitioner based his argument of being exempt from the death pen-
alty on the Supreme Court decisions in Panetti v. Quarterman and Ford v. Wainwright).
7. 447 U.S. 399 (1986).
8. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that "the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is in-
sane"). Noting that no state currently permits execution of insane persons, the Supreme
Court concluded that the restriction upon a state's ability to execute is both ancient and
humane. Id. at 408-09. Accordingly, "[w]hether its aim be to protect the condemned from
fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself
from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance," the Eighth Amendment precludes
execution of the insane. Id. at 410.
9. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
10. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2856 (2007) (clarifying how the Ford deci-
sion requires that capital defendants who have made "a substantial threshold showing of
insanity" receive certain minimal protections including a fair hearing, an opportunity to be
heard, and "constitutionally acceptable procedure[s]" (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 426-27 (1986))).
11. See id. at 2856-57 (holding that because the state trial court did not provide
Panetti with an evidentiary hearing, or an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence,
Panetti was not afforded the protections afforded under Ford).
12. See James C. McKinley Jr., Federal Judge, Chastising the Texas Courts, Orders a
Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008, at A12 (reporting that Judge Orlando Luis
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tion or mental illness, the court concluded that Wood had met a "substan-
tial threshold showing of insanity., 13 The court relied on several facts in
making this determination including the fact that Wood had previously
been found incompetent to stand trial by one jury; reports which sug-
gested that Wood's intellectual functioning was at the low average range;
Wood had narcissistic tendencies and an almost delusional belief that he
would be vindicated; and finally that he had suicidal ideas combined with
bizarre and paranoid behavior.1 4 Wood's evidentiary hearing is sched-
uled for February or March 2009.15 This Comment will not explore the
validity of Wood's incompetency claim. Instead, the focus is on why
Wood was hours away from being executed even though he is mentally ill.
This paper will also focus on those who, like Wood, have been sentenced
to death despite having a serious mental illness or mental retardation.
Indeed, Wood's situation is not unique. As of January 1, 2008, there
were 3309 death row inmates in the United States. 6 The states with the
highest number of death row inmates are California, Florida and Texas.' 7
Of the death row inmates, it is estimated that as many as twenty-five per-
cent have a serious mental illness. 8 Serious mental illnesses include "ma-jor depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive
disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
Garcia, a federal district judge in San Antonio, granted a stay of execution for at least six
months based on Mr. Wood's bizarre statement at his trial, among other factors). It is
unconstitutional for the death penalty to be imposed when the defendant has no under-
standing of the matter at hand. Id.
13. Wood, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 818.
Admittedly, the evidence of petitioner's alleged incompetence now before this Court
is far from compelling. Petitioner has never been definitively diagnosed with any
mental illness .... Nonetheless, there are facts properly before this Court which may
lend support to the conclusion petitioner has made a "substantial threshold showing of
insanity." Id.
14. Id. at 818-19 (concluding that a stay of execution was warranted based not only on
facts alleged in the motion, but also on review of the "records of petitioner's state trial,
direct appeal, and state habeas corpus proceedings"); see James C. McKinley Jr., Federal
Judge, Chastising the Texas Courts, Orders a Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008,
at A12 (reporting on the scheduled execution of Jeffrey Lee Wood, halted just hours
before the execution).
15. Wood, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("[C]ounsel for both parties shall
advise the Court in writing regarding their respective availability during the months of
February and March, 2009 to attend an evidentiary hearing .... ").
16. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2008), http:/
/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf.
17. Id. (reporting on the number of death row inmates per state). California has 667
death row inmates, Florida has 397, and Texas has 373. Id.
18. James R. Eisenberg, Forcibly Medicating Death Row Inmates with Mental Illness-
An Ethical Dilemma, BEHAV. HEALTH MGMT., Jan. 1, 2004, at 9 (reporting an estimated
twenty-five percent of death row inmates are mentally ill).
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and borderline personality disorder."19 Even after Ford, mentally ill indi-
viduals are still on death row because identifying mental illness can be
difficult for counsel and the courts. 20 Because of this difficulty, defense
counsel and courts may overlook a defendant's mental illness and fail to
realize that the defendant is entitled to exemption from the death
penalty.2 '
The same is possible for mentally retarded capital defendants. Three
criteria are most commonly used to define mental retardation: "signifi-
cantly subaverage intellectual functioning; concurrent and related limita-
tions in two or more adaptive skill areas; and manifestation before age
eighteen.",22 According to the World Health Organization, one to three
percent of the world's population is mentally retarded.23 It is currently
19. National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/nform-I Yourself/About -Mental-Illness/About-Mental-Illness.
htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (listing the types of serious mental illnesses).
Serious mental illnesses include major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, ob-
sessive compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and borderline personality disorder.
The World Health Organization has reported that four of the [ten] leading causes of
disability in the U.S. and other developed countries are mental disorders. By 2020,
Major Depressive illness will be the leading cause of disability in the world for women
and children.
Without treatment the consequences of mental illness for the individual and society
are staggering: unnecessary disability, unemployment, substance abuse, homelessness,
inappropriate incarceration, suicide and wasted lives; [t]he economic cost of untreated
mental illness is more than 100 billion dollars each year in the United States. Id.
20. See Andrea Stier & Stephen P. Hinshaw, Explicit and Implicit Stigma Against In-
dividuals with Mental Illness, 42 AUSTRAL. PSYCHOLOGIST 106, 106 (2007) (illustrating that
the mentally ill try to hide their symptoms). When the mentally ill hide their symptoms, it
makes it hard for counsel to identify that their client is mentally ill.
21. See Randal I. Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 928 (2001) (stating that mental illnesses "are
difficult to diagnose and are not usually readily apparent"); see also Angela F. Epps, To
Pay or Not to Pay, That Is the Question: Should SS1 Recipients Be Exempt from Child
Support Obligations?, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 63, 97 (2002) ("Some disabilities, particularly
mental illnesses, will not be readily apparent."). Since it is generally difficult to diagnose
mental illness, it follows that counsel will also share in this difficulty of identifying their
mentally ill clients.
22. ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, BEYOND REASON:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (2001), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ustat03Ol.pdf (elucidating the most common defini-
tion of mental retardation). "Mental retardation is a lifelong condition of impaired or
incomplete mental development." Id. Standardized tests are used during the first step to
diagnose and classify a person who may have mental retardation. Id.
23. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2001: MENTAL HEALTH:
NEW UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE 35 (2001), http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.
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estimated that there are between 6.2 and 7.5 million mentally retarded
individuals in the United States.a4
In Atkins v. Virginia,z5 the U.S. Supreme Court held the execution of
mentally retarded individuals unconstitutional. 26 Before the Atkins deci-
sion in 2002, at least thirty-five mentally retarded defendants were exe-
cuted between 1976, when the death penalty was reinstated, and 2001.27
Despite the protections afforded in Atkins, it is possible that mentally
retarded individuals, like the mentally ill, will still be executed because
recognizing the symptoms of mental retardation can also be extremely
difficult.2 8
This Comment will examine the difficulties that counsel and courts
have in identifying a defendant's mental illness or mental retardation.
The first part of this Comment will review the differences and similarities
between mental illness and retardation; address the relevant case law re-
garding the exemption of the mentally ill and mentally retarded from the
death penalty; and then identify the opinions of states, the international
community, and organizations regarding the death penalty. The second
section of this Comment will examine how counsel ineffectively assist
their capital defendants by failing to notice that their client is mentally ill
or mentally retarded; failing to raise the issue of the client's mental retar-
dation or mental illness; and failing to present expert testimony regarding
their defendant's mental retardation or illness. Finally, the third part of
this Comment will provide recommendations to defense counsel and
courts to avoid allowing mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants to
be sentenced to execution.
pdf (stating there is an estimated worldwide prevalence of mental retardation of one to
three percent). "The prevalence figures vary considerably because of the varying criteria
and methods used in the surveys, as well as differences in the age range of the samples."
Id.
24. ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. Ri-s. WATCH, BEYOND REASON:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 8 (2001), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ustat03Ol.pdf.
25. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
26. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally
retarded defendants is unconstitutional because it violates the Eighth Amendment).
27. ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. Rrs. WATCH, BEYOND REASON:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS wrrH MENTAL RETARDATION 2 (2001), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ustat03Ol.pdf.
28. See Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating Mental
Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILrT L. REP. 529, 530 (1998) ("[O]ften many inmates with mental retardation who
are facing the death penalty were not identified as intellectually impaired until after they
were sentenced to death.").
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Mental Retardation vs. Mental Illness
1. Mental Retardation
The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabili-
ties (AAIDD)29 defines mental retardation as a disability originating
before the age of eighteen, "characterized by significant limitations both
in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in con-
ceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills."3 A person's intellectual
functioning is determined by an Intelligence Quotient (IQ) score.31 Ac-
cording to the AAIDD, an IQ test score of seventy or below indicates
that a person suffers from some degree of intellectual impairment.32
And, according to the AAIDD, an IQ score of seventy to seventy-five
may also indicate mental retardation giving account for the "standard er-
ror of measurement."33 Adaptive behavior refers to "the conceptual, so-
cial, and practical skills that people have learned to be able to function in
29. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, About
Us, http://www.aamr.org/content_1.cfm?navlD=2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
30. American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Frequently
Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, http://
www.aamr.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonID.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2009). The
AAIDD states that intellectual disability is the current preferred term for disabilities his-
torically referred to as mental retardation. Id. However, because the majority of the case
law and other authorities cited in this paper refer to this disability as mental retardation,
this paper will also continue to use that term for clarity and convenience.
31. See id. While the AAIDD definition of mental retardation requires a finding of
low IQ score, that is no longer the sole focus of the definition. See id. In 1992, the
AAIDD departed from identifying mental retardation solely on the basis of an IQ score
and changed its definition to include social, environmental and other related considera-
tions. Id.
32. See id. (noting that an IQ test is an important tool in measuring intellectual func-
tioning and mental capacity for learning, reasoning, and problem solving). An IQ score in
the range of sixty to seventy is "approximately the scholastic equivalent of the third
grade." ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, BEYOND REASON:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 9 (2001), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ustat030l.pdf (explaining that an IQ test is best
communicated by referencing what "mental" age someone is at). For example, a person
who is said to have the "mental age" of a six-year-old means that he or she would receive
the same grade on an IQ score as the average six-year old-child. Id.
33. See AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) (identifying an IQ score
below 70-7, as subaverage intellectual functioning); Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles
to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1215 (2008) (stating that
the AAMR Manuals "refer to an IQ score range of approximately 70 to 75 points, in order
to factor in what is referred to as the 'standard error of measurement."' (footnote
omitted)).
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their everyday lives" and is assessed by standardized tests evaluating
those skills overall or individually.34
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) defines mental retarda-
tion similarly." The APA publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) which is a "comprehensive
classification and reference manual on mental disorders, their manifesta-
tions and treatment., 36 The DSM-IV defines mental retardation as char-
acterized by three components: (1) "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning" (2) "with an onset before age 18 years" and (3) "concurrent
deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning., 37 The adaptive func-
tioning impairments must fall in at least two of the following skill areas:
"communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, lei-
sure, health, and safety.",38 The "significantly subaverage intellectual
34. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Fre-
quently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, http://
www.aamr.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonID.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (stating ex-
amples of conceptual skills which include "receptive and expressive language, reading and
writing, money concepts, [and] self-directions"). Examples of SOCIAL SKILLS include "in-
terpersonal responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility (likelihood of being tricked or manipu-
lated), naivet6, follows rules, obeys laws, [and] avoids victimization." Id. Examples of
PRACTICAL SKILLS INCLUDE "personal activities of daily living such as eating, dressing, mo-
bility and toileting." Id. Practical skills also include the "instrumental activities of daily
living such as preparing meals, taking medication, using the telephone, managing money,
using transportation, and doing housekeeping activities." Id.
35. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legis-
lative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP 11, 13 (2003) ("The American
Psychiatric Association's formulation [for assessing the existence of mental retardation]
follows the 1992 AAMR version closely .... ). See Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine
Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislators and Courts
Can Provide Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L REV. 811, 820 (2007) (stating that the AAMR defines mental
retardation as "a disability characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual func-
tioning and in adaptive behavior" and as a disability that has developmental onset before
the age of eighteen years). The definition sets up a "three prong test: (1) significantly sub-
average intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in adaptive behavior, and (3)
onset before age eighteen." Id. at 821.
36. Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Chart-
ing the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the
Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 913 n.15 (2001) (describing the purpose of the DSM-
IV put out by the American Psychiatric Association as a guide to mental disorders). Spe-
cifically, the DSM-IV provides a definition for mental retardation which includes "subaver-
age general intellectual functioning" and "limitations in adaptive functioning." Id. at 913.
37. MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS, THE ESSENTIAL
COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
382-83 (4th ed. 1995) (listing the essential elements of mental retardation).
38. See id. at 383.
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functioning" is generally indicated by an IQ score of seventy or lower.3 9
However, like the AAIDD, the DSM-IV includes, within its definition of
mental retardation, individuals with an IQ score in the range of seventy-
one to seventy-five if they have also have significant deficits in adaptive
functioning."n
2. Mental Illness
Mental illness is defined as "any of various conditions characterized by
impairment of an individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or behavioral
functioning, and caused by social, psychological, biochemical, genetic or
other factors."'" Diagnosing mental illness can be more difficult than di-
agnosing other general medical disorders since there is no definitive labo-
ratory test or abnormality in the brain tissue that can identify the
illness.42
Mental illnesses lie on a "continuum of severity."43 Even though
mental disorders are prevalent in the United States population, only one
in seventeen Americans has a serious mental illness.44 Serious mental
39. See id. at 382-83.
40. See id. at 383.
Although the IQ cutoff point for a diagnosis of Mental Retardation is set at 70 (about
2 standard deviations below the mean), it must be recognized that the measurement
error associated with standard IQ tests is plus or minus 5 points. Therefore, in some
cases a measured IQ of up to 75 could be compatible with a diagnosis of Mental Re-
tardation when the clinical picture is also accompanied by significant impairment in
adaptive functioning .... Id.
41. Stephanie Zywein, Executing the Insane: A Look at the Death Penalty Schemes in
Arkansas, Georgia, and Texas, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93,113 (2007) (citing
the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000)). The article
delineates the difference between mental illness, retardation, and schizophrenic patients.
Id.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
Surgeon General 44 (1999), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/pdfs/
c2.pdf ("The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be more difficult than diag-
nosis of somatic, or general medical, disorders, since there is no definitive lesion, labora-
tory test, or abnormality in brain tissue that can identify the illness."). Mental health
disorders are typically referred to as disorders rather than diseases because of the clinical
criteria necessary to diagnose mental retardation. Id.
43. National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org/
Content/NavigationMenu/Inform-Yourself/About-Mental-Illness/About-Mental-Illness.
htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (stating that mental illness is a widespread problem in our
nation but only six percent of our population lives with a serious mental disorder).
Mental disorders fall along a continuum of severity. Even though mental disorders
are widespread in the population, the main burden of illness is concentrated in a much
smaller population - about 6 [%], or 1 in 17 Americans - who suffer from a serious
mental illness. It is estimated that mental illness affects 1 in 5 families in America. Id.
44. Id.
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illnesses include "major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, ob-
sessive compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), and borderline personality disorder. '' 45 The most com-
mon mental illnesses experienced by defendants "include bipolar disor-
der, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression and borderline personality disorder.,
46
Mental illness cannot be controlled or overcome by willpower. 47 How-
ever, they are treatable.48 Treatments can include medication as well as
"psychosocial treatment such as cognitive behavioral therapy, interper-
sonal therapy, peer support groups, and other community services., 49 In
fact, between seventy and ninety percent of people suffering from severe
mental illness experience a significant reduction of symptoms and an im-
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Illness and the Death Pen-
alty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=782&scid=66 (last visited Mar. 21,
2009) ("Some of the more common illnesses experienced by inmates on death row may
include: Bipolar Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disor-
der, Schizoaffective Disorder, Schizophrenia [and] Suicide"); see also American Civil Lib-
erties Union, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the United States, http://
www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/10617pub20050131.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)
(listing some of the common mental illnesses associated with death row inmates).
47. See National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Mental Illness, http://www.nami.
org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform-Yourself/About-Mental-Illness/About-Mental-Ill-
ness.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) ("Mental illnesses are biologically based brain disor-
ders. They cannot be overcome through 'will power' and are not related to a person's
'character' or intelligence.").
With appropriate effective medication and a wide range of services tailored to their
needs, most people who live with serious mental illnesses can significantly reduce the
impact of their illness and find a satisfying measure of achievement and independence.
A key concept is to develop expertise in developing strategies to manage the illness
process. Id.
48. See id. (explaining how most individuals who suffer from a mental illness can re-
cover through active participation in an individual treatment plan).
Mental illnesses can affect persons of any age, race, religion, or income. Mental ill-
nesses are not the result of personal weakness, lack of character, or poor upbringing.
Mental illnesses are treatable. Most people diagnosed with a serious mental illness
can experience relief from their symptoms by actively participating in an individual
treatment plan. Id.
49. Id.
In addition to medication treatment, psychosocial treatment such as cognitive behav-
ioral therapy, interpersonal therapy, peer support groups, and other community ser-
vices can also be components of a treatment plan and that assist with recovery. The
availability of transportation, diet, exercise, sleep, friends, and meaningful paid or vol-
unteer activities contribute to overall health and wellness, including mental illness re-
covery. Id.
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proved quality of life when they receive a "combination of pharmacologi-
cal and psychosocial treatments and supports."5 °
3. Comparing Mental Retardation and Mental Illness
Mental retardation is not a form of mental illness but rather a unique
developmental condition separate from mental illness.51 To begin, the
first difference is that mental retardation can arise at birth or early child-
hood and must be present by the time an individual turns eighteen years
old.52 However, mental illness can first be experienced in a person's
adulthood.53 Next, the most significant difference between mental illness
and mental retardation is that "mentally ill people encounter distur-
bances in their thought processes and emotions; mentally retarded people
have limited abilities to learn." 54 A mentally retarded person, by defini-
tion, must have a low IQ whereas in mental illness, intelligence is not a
factor.5 To illustrate, a mentally ill person suffering from a condition
such as schizophrenia can have a very high IQ, while a mentally retarded
50. Id.
MentalIllness.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) ("The best treatments for serious
mental illnesses today are highly effective; between 70 and 90 [%] of individuals have
significant reduction of symptoms and improved quality of life with a combination of
pharmacological and psychosocial treatments and supports.").
51. See Aimee Logan, Who Says So? Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Sci-
ence, Sentiment, and Consensus, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 195, 197-98 (2008) (stating that
"mental illness is caused by bio-psycho-social factors that affect one's behavior and psycho-
logical disposition," whereas mental retardation is "caused by various biological, social,
behavioral, medical, educational and hereditary factors"). Mental illness and mental retar-
dation are not synonymous, nor a "subset or type of mental illness." Id.
52. MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS, THE ESSENTIAL
COMPANION TO ThE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
382-83 (4th ed. 1995) (stating that the onset of mental retardation must occur before the
individual turns eighteen years old).
53. See National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Mental Illness, http://www.nami.
org/ContentfNavigationMenu/Inform-Yourself/About-Mental-Iliness/About-Mental-ll-
ness.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (stating that a person can develop a mental illness at
any stage in life). "Mental illnesses usually strike individuals in the prime of their lives,
often during adolescence and young adulthood. All ages are susceptible, but the young
and the old are especially vulnerable." Id.
54. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424 (1985) (describing the differences between mentally ill and
mentally retarded classifications). "[P]eople of any level of intelligence may be mentally
ill." Id. at n.53. However, most people who are mentally retarded are not mentally ill. Id.
55. See MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS, THE ESSENTIAL
COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
382-383 (4th ed. 1995) (stating IQ is not a factor in deciding if a person is mentally ill).
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person always has a low IQ.56 Another key difference is that a mentally
ill person may improve or even be cured with therapy or medication but
mental retardation is a life long disability.57 However, mentally retarded
individuals will continually live with diminished intellectual capacity, al-
though they may be able to slowly acquire additional skills and abilities
with age.58
While mental retardation is not the same thing as mental illness, this
does not mean that a mentally retarded individual cannot suffer from a
mental illness.59 Indeed, mental retardation often "coexists with other
mental disorders."6 In fact, "between twenty to thirty-five percent of all
non-institutionalized mentally retarded persons also have some form of
mental illness., 61
56. ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, HuM. RTS. WATCH, BEYOND REASON:
THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17 (2001), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ustat03Ol.pdf (explaining that this can happen be-
cause mental illness can occur where a person has intact intellectual function except where
his or her thinking breaks from reality as with hallucinations).
57. Id. ("A person who is mentally ill may improve or be cured with therapy or medi-
cation, but mental retardation is a permanent state.").
58. See World Health Organization: Regional Office for South-East Asia, What is
Mental Retardation?, http://www.searo.who.int/en/Section1l74/Section1l99/Sectionl567/
Section1825_8084.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (stating that people with mental retarda-
tion will "continue to have diminished intellectual capacity" throughout their life, but for
most individuals with mental retardation, the parts of the brain that are not damaged
continue to develop); see also MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS,
THE ESSENTIAL COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 382-83 (4th ed. 1995) ("[B]ecause IQ tends to be relatively stable over time, it
is often assumed that Mental Retardation is lifelong. However, improvement in adaptive
functioning ... can result in sufficient improvement in functioning so that a diagnosis of
Mental Retardation is no longer appropriate.").
59. See Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death:
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from
the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 915 (2001) ("It is important to recognize that
mental retardation is not a form of mental illness. This is not to say a mentally retarded
individual might not suffer from some form of mental illness." (footnote omitted)). How-
ever, mental retardation is distinct from mental illness in that it is a developmental condi-
tion. Id.; see also MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS, THE
ESSENTIAL COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS 382 (4th ed. 1995) (explaining that mental retardation often coexists with other
mental disorders).
60. Id. (noting that mental retardation often coexists with other mental disorders and
instructing clinicians to "conduct a thorough psychiatric evaluation to determine whether
another coexisting condition is present").
61. Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Chart-
ing the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the
Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 915 (2001) (stating the percentage of non-institution-
alized persons with mental retardation who also have a mental illness).
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B. Precedent
1. Ford v. Wainwright - Supreme Court Decision on Executing the
Mentally Insane
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that it is unconstitu-
tional to execute prisoners who are insane at the time of their execu-
tion.62 In Ford, the Court reasoned that it was unconstitutional to impose
a punishment on an individual whose mental illness prevented him from
"comprehending the reason for the penalty or its implications., 63  In
making its decision, the Court considered how the nation currently views
the death penalty.64 The Court conducted a survey of states and found
that no state permitted the execution of mentally retarded individuals. 65
These findings led the Court to conclude that such punishment was cruel
and unusual and, therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment under
current national standards.66
The majority in Ford did not provide a definition of "competence," nor
did it specify the standards or procedures for evaluating and determining
what constitutes mental illness.67 Instead, the Court left defining mental
62. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10 ("[T]his court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is
insane."). Though no American jurisdiction has ever permitted execution of the insane,
the Court ruled for the first time in its history that the Constitution forbids the practice of
executing persons who are insane at the time of execution. id. at 401.
63. Id. at 417 (concluding that a Florida statute provided inadequate assurances of
reliability in determining whether death row inmates are so mentally ill that they cannot
comprehend the nature and reasons for their punishment). According to the Court, put-
ting a mentally ill prisoner to death is, and has always been, morally abhorrent. Id.
64. Id. at 406 (noting the common law has historically branded execution of mentally
ill prisoners "savage and inhuman"). In the United States, forty-one of fifty states have a
death penalty, and statutes in twenty-six of those states expressly forbid execution of the
insane. Id. at 410 n.2. At least four more death penalty states have adopted the common
law ban by judicial decision, while still others provide discretionary statutory procedures
for suspending punishment in cases where death row inmates have become mentally ill
pending execution. Id. Four states have no specific procedure governing execution of the
mentally ill, but those states have not expressly repudiated the common law rule. Id.
65. Id. at 409 ("[T]he natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has
no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the
intuition that such an execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared across this
Nation.").
66. Id. at 410 (finding that a petitioner's allegation of insanity in a habeas corpus peti-
tion would, under the Eighth Amendment, bar his execution).
67. See generally Ford, 477 U.S. 399. However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Pow-
ell concluded the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment
should be triggered for defendants "who are unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it." Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). This essentially
limited the Court's holding to protecting only those individuals who are psychotic. See
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illness and retardation to the states.68 This omission led to the problem
of a wide diversity of death penalty state statutes with disparate degrees
of protection for the mentally ill.69
2. Penry v. Lynaugh - Supreme Court Decision on Executing the
Mentally Ill
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh7 ° held that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit executions of mentally retarded
criminals.71 Similar to its analysis in Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court in Penry examined the national consensus on the death penalty,
while specifically focusing its analysis on the consensus among state legis-
latures.72 At the time of the ruling, only one state specifically outlawed
the execution of the mentally retarded and Maryland had enacted legisla-
tion barring the execution of the mentally retarded that would take effect
a week after the Court handed down its decision.73 The Court inter-
Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 351, 355 (2006).
68. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 ("[W]e leave to the State the task of developing appro-
priate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences."). The
Court conceded that prisoners alleging insanity might be required to meet a high threshold
showing in order to avoid inundating the courts with unmeritorious claims. Id. at 417. The
law must afford courts wide latitude in pragmatically limiting these types of claims. Id. at
417.
69. See Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 355 (2006) (stating that the Supreme Court's failure to
specify standards or procedure for determining mental illness was "an omission that has
contributed to the diversity of death penalty statutes and the disparate degrees of protec-
tion they afford the mentally ill"); see also Dan Malone, Cruel and Inhumane: Executing
the Mentally Ill, AMNESTY INT'L MAG., Fall 2005, at 20, 23, available at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/magazine/cruel-and-inhumane-executing-the-mentallyill.html ("[T]he Ford deci-
sion left the determination of sanity up to each state and herein lies the heart of the
problem.").
70. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
71. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that mental retardation may
be used as a factor that could lessen a defendant's culpability for a capital offense, but that
mental retardation alone cannot be used as an exemption to execution), abrogated by At-
kins v. Vir., 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
72. Id. at 331 ("The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.").
73. See id. at 334 ("Only one State, however, currently bans execution of retarded
persons who have been found guilty of a capital offense. Maryland has enacted a similar
statute which will take effect on July 1, 1989."); GA. CODE. ANN.§ 17-7-131(j) (2008) (cit-
ing the Georgia statute banning the execution of the mentally retarded); MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 27, § 412(f)(1)(1989) (banning the execution of mentally retarded people), repealed by
MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-202 (West 2002) (prohibiting the imposition of the death
sentence upon individuals who were "mentally retarded" at the time such individual com-
mitted the act of murder).
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preted this as evidence that no national consensus existed on the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded and consequently held that the execution of
the mentally retarded was constitutional.
74
While the Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded criminal is
constitutionally permissible, it still overturned the defendant's death sen-
tence because Texas did not have the proper mitigating special issues and
jury instructions.75 The Texas special issue asked whether the defendant
acted "deliberately and with reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased would result.",76 Since it did not define what "deliberately"
meant, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury was unable to give a
"reasoned moral response" to the mitigating evidence of the defendant's
mental retardation.77 Essentially, the Court held that it is constitutional
to execute the mentally ill "as long as the jury is aware of mitigating fac-
tors such as the defendant's mental retardation"."
3. Atkins v. Virginia - Supreme Court Decision on Executing
Mentally Retarded
Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of armed robbery, abduction, and
capital murder based on his involvement in the murder of Eric Nesbitt in
1996."9 Despite evidence that Atkins was mentally retarded, he was sen-
tenced to death.8" In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the execu-
74. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (finding that there was no national consensus for or
against the execution of the mentally retarded).
75. Id. at 328.
In this case, in the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and
give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused back-
ground by declining to impose the death penalty, we conclude that the jury was not
provided with a vehicle for expressing its "reasoned moral response" to that evidence
in rendering its sentencing decision. Our reasoning in Lockett and Eddings thus com-
pels a remand for resentencing so that we do not risk that the death penalty will be
imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. Id.
76. See id. at 310 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981
and Supp. 1989)).
77. Id. at 322 (remarking that jurors may have found that Penry was "less able than a
normal adult to control his impulses or evaluate the consequences of his conduct").
78. See Jamie Marie Billotte, Note, Is It Justified? The Death Penalty and Mental,
Retardation, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. EImics & PuB. POL'Y 333, 336 (1994) ("The court opined
that as long as the jury is aware of mitigating factors such as the defendant's mental retar-
dation, a jury's finding of guilt sufficient to warrant death is allowed.").
79. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 ("Petitioner, Daryl Renard Atkins, was convicted of ab-
duction, armed robbery, and capital murder and sentenced to death.").
80. Id. at 308-09 (stating that Atkins was sentenced to death even after the presenta-
tion of evidence regarding his mental retardation).
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tion of any individual with mental retardation violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.81
The Supreme Court held that the implementation of the Atkins deci-
sion does not prohibit states from holding the mentally retarded account-
able for their crimes, but only exempts them from execution.82 The
Court's holding created a categorical exemption from the death penalty
for mentally retarded individuals.83 The Court reached this conclusion by
conducting a survey of state legislatures to ascertain the national consen-
sus on the death penalty, as it had done in Penry and Ford.84 Since Penry,
eighteen of the thirty states that allowed the death penalty enacted legis-
lation specifically prohibiting the death penalty for people with mental
retardation.85 The Court also found that not a single state had legislation
moving away from the national consensus by reinstating the death pen-
alty for the mentally retarded.86 The Court concluded from its survey
81. Id. at 321-22 (holding that the execution of mentally retarded defendants is cruel
and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth Amendment).
82. See id. at 305.
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal re-
sponsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however,
they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct. Id.
See also Graham Baker, Defining and Determining Retardation in Texas Capital Murder
Defendants: A Proposal to the Texas Legislature, 9 SCHOLAR 237, 245 (2007) ("Atkins did
not prohibit states from holding mentally retarded offenders criminally accountable; it re-
moved from the available sentencing options the most severe criminal sanction.").
83. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 ("[Tlhe mentally retarded should be categorically excluded
from execution."); see Stephanie Zywein, Executing the Insane: A Look at Death Penalty
Schemes in Arkansas, Georgia and Texas, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADvoc. 93, 99
(2007). ("Further, the Court stated that the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally
retarded person failed to serve two main purposes of capital punishment: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes.").
84. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16 (noting that national consensus on the death penalty
had significantly changed since Penry, and that many state legislatures had begun to ad-
dress the issue of executing the mentally retarded).
85. See id. at 314-16 (summarizing the survey the Court made concerning state statu-
tory changes concerning the execution of the mentally retarded); see also Richard J. Bon-
nie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How
Legislators and Courts Can Provide Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental Re-
tardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L RFv. 811, 812 (2007) ("Between Penry and
Atkins, eighteen states enacted legislation specifically banning the death penalty for people
with mental retardation, and similar bills were passed by at least one house of the legisla-
ture in at least three other states.").
86. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16.
Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legisla-
tion providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of
States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons and the complete ab-
[Vol. 11:413
MENTALLY ILL CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
that in the thirteen years since Penry, national consensus had shifted
against the execution of the mentally retarded.87 While the court noted
specific state legislation, it stated that the number of states that enacted
legislation was not as significant as the "consistency of the direction of
change. "88
Furthermore, the Court did not base its decision solely on national con-
sensus;8 9 it also based its holding on two other primary issues. 9° First, the
Court determined that imposing the death sentence on a mentally re-
tarded individual violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.91 The Court reasoned that punishing
mentally retarded criminals with execution does not satisfy the traditional
justifications of the death penalty- retribution and deterrence.92 Sec-
ond, the Court reasoned that the reduced capacity of mentally retarded
offenders makes them ineligible for the death penalty because, due to a
variety of factors, they are at a high risk of wrongful execution.
93
sence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions
provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders
as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. Id.
87. Id. at 316 (stating that the practice of executing the mentally retarded has become
"truly unusual" and that it is "fair to say that a national consensus has developed against
it").
88. See id. at 315 ("It is not so much the number of these States that is significant but
the consistency of the direction of change.").
89. See Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People with Mental Disabilities: How We Can Miti-
gate an Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 283, 287 (2006).
By the time of Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court concluded that enough had
changed with regard to the standards of decency that it would now hold unconstitu-
tional the execution of people with mental retardation. But its holding was not based
solely on the many additional state laws barring such executions. Id.
90. Ronald S. Honberg, The Injustice of Imposing Death Sentences on People with
Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2005) (stating that in Atkins, the
Court first considered "whether the traditional justifications for the death penalty, retribu-
tion and deterrence, applied in cases of mental retardation" and second, considered the
potentially adverse impact of mental retardation on the fairness of capital proceedings).
91. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (writing for the majority, Justice Stevens determined that
in light of "evolving standards of decency," it would be excessive to punish a mentally
retarded defendant with capital punishment).
92. Id. at 318-19 ("Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded
person 'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it "is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,"' and hence an unconstitutional
punishment."' (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982))).
93. Id. at 320-21 (noting that the increased risk of false confessions, the defendants'
probable difficulty in communicating with counsel, and the likelihood that they are poor
witnesses to testify on their own behalf, subjected them to "a special risk of wrongful exe-
cution"); see John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the Non-Willing: Atkins, The
Volitionally Incapacitated, and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REv. 93, 107 (2003) ("The
Court noted that due to their impairments those with mental retardation 'have diminished
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Finally, it is important to note that the Atkins decision did not provide
a definition of "mentally ill" or "mentally retarded" for the states to fol-low.9 4 Instead, like its decision in Ford, the Court directed the states to
create their own definitions of mental retardation." But, while the Court
explicitly left it to the states to determine how to define mental retarda-
tion, it tacitly provided two methods of defining mental retardation by
referencing the AAIDD and APA definitions of mental retardation.96
The Ford and Atkins decisions left it up to the states to decide crucial
definitions with regard to mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants.97
Ford left states the burden of deciding what constitutes "incompetence
for execution" of the mentally ill defendants.98 Atkins left states the bur-
den of deciding what constitutes mental retardation.99
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mis-
takes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others.'").
94. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ("As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, with
regard to insanity, 'we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."' (citing Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986))).
95. See id. (leaving the states to determine their own definition of mental retardation,
and noting that current statutory definitions of mental retardation tend to conform to
clinical definitions of mental retardation).
96. See Lois A. Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia,
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1209 (2008) (stating that by introducing the AAIDD and APA
definitions of mental retardation, the Court tacitly signaled that it approved of the use of
these definitions of mental retardation).
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is charac-
terized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with
related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academic, leisure, and work. Mental retardation
manifests before age 18. Id. (footnote omitted).
97. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (restating the holding in Ford that the Court would once
again "leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the consti-
tutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences"); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
416-17 (1986) (leaving it to the states to decide what constitutes insanity and to develop
methods to enforce the Eighth Amendment restriction against executing the mentally ill).
98. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17.
99. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
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C. Evolving Public Consensus on Executing Mentally Ill & Mentally
Retarded Defendants
1. State Legislation
In the United States, there are currently thirty-six states that have the
death penalty. 1" After the Atkins decision, eight states passed legislation
in conformity with the ruling.1" 1 Of the eighteen states mentioned in At-
kins, seventeen of them determine if a defendant has mental retardation
solely by using the clinical criteria from the AAIDD and the APA.
102
100. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2008),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (listing the states that have the death pen-
alty). The states that have the death penalty are Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, New Hamp-
shire, South Carolina, Wyoming, Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, California, Illinois, Missouri,
Ohio, Texas, Colorado, Indiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah, Connecticut, Kansas, Ne-
braska, Oregon, Virginia, Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
Id.
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(c)(1), (d)(1) (West 2004) (exempting mentally re-
tarded defendants from execution while allowing non-capital punishments to be enforced
against mentally retarded defendants); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2006) (main-
taining that if a court finds that a defendant's IQ qualifies them as being mentally retarded
under the definition in Idaho the defendant will not be subjected to the death penalty); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/114-15(e)-(f) (West 2003) (exempting mentally retarded defend-
ants from execution and if the defendant's mental disability does not meet the level of
"mental retardation" as defined by the statute the defendant can still use evidence of his
mental retardation as mitigating evidence during sentencing); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2007) (exempting mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.098(6) (2005) (requiring that after certain procedures are followed,
if a defendant is found to be mentally retarded the court will strike the motion to seek the
death penalty); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-101 (2003) (exempting mentally retarded de-
fendants and those with sub-average intellectual functioning from execution when certain
conditions are met); see also Death Penalty Information Center, States that Have Changed
Their Statutes to Comply with the Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-comply-supreme-courts-de-
cision-atkins-v-virginia (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (listing California, Delaware, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Nevada, Utah, and Virginia as states that have changed their statutes to
comply with the Atkins decision); see also Nigel Beail & William J. Edwards, Rigidity and
Flexibility in Diagnosing Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 42 Mental Retardation No. 6,
480 (2004) (discussing the Supreme Court ruling in Atkins and how "after the Atkins deci-
sion, another [seven] states passed legislation to conform to the United States Supreme
Court ruling"). Several people argue that the same benefits extended to those who are
mentally retarded should be extended to people who "demonstrate the same vulnerabili-
ties regardless of whether they qualify for the label of mental retardation." Id.
102. See Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing
Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislators and Courts Can Provide Accurate Assessments and
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RIcH. L REV. 811, 819
(2007) ("Of the eighteen state statutes mentioned in Atkins, seventeen of them use exclu-
sively clinical criteria drawn from these definitions."). "The Kansas statute defined being
mentally retarded as 'having significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning... to
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2. European Consensus
There is an international trend away from imposing the death penalty
for all types of crimes and all types of defendants. 0 3 In fact, as of 2007,
the death penalty has been abolished, in law or in practice, by 138 coun-
tries. 1 4 The European Union has abolished the death penalty and the
United Nations created a resolution calling for a moratorium on execu-
tions, 1°5 which was supported by eighty-seven governments from all over
the world.'0 6 The countries with the highest death penalty rates are
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States of America. 10 7
Additionally, it appears that the United States is a minority in the in-
ternational community when it comes to executing mentally retarded de-
an extent which substantially impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's
conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law,' using the Model Penal
Code's criteria for the insanity defense." Id.
103. See AMNESTY INT'L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2008, at 5 (2008),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/annual-report/DeathSentencesExecutions2008.pdf (re-
porting that over two-thirds of the world's countries have now essentially abolished the
death penalty); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union, How the Death Penalty Weakens U.S.
International Interests 5 (2004), http://www.aclu.org/capital/intl/10619pub20041209.html
(follow "Download" hyperlink) (noting how the United States' European allies are dis-
pleased with American law regarding the death penalty).
French President Jacques Chirac criticized the United States before the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, saying, "What can be said of the execution of minors or of per-
sons suffering from mental deficiencies? I call for a worldwide abolition of the death
penalty, the first step of which would be a general moratorium." Id.
104. AMNESTY INT'L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2008, at 8 (2008), http:/
/www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/annual-report/DeathSentencesExecutions2008.pdf (stating
that a total of 138 countries are abolitionist states that have abolished the death penalty,
either in law or in practice).
105. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How THE DEATH PENALTY WEAKENS U.S. INTER-
NATIONAL INTERESTS 3 (2004), http://www.aclu.org/capital/intl/10619pub20041209.html
(follow "Download" hyperlink) (providing an example of how the European Union com-
pelled the Russians into abolishment of the death penalty). "The Council of Europe and
the European Union have made abolition of the death penalty a condition of member-
ship." Id.
106. See Dorean M. Koenig, International Reaction to Death Penalty Practices in the
United States, 28 HUM. RTs. Q. 14, 15 (2001).
United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan has endorsed the call for a mora-
torium on executions. The UN General Assembly has adopted the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, acknowledging a
worldwide effort to abolish capital punishment for all purposes and obligating each
state party to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its juris-
diction. Id.
107. AMNESTY INT'L, DEATH SENEI-NCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2008, at 5 (2008), http:/
/www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/annual-report/DeathSentencesExecutions2008.pdf (report-
ing that in 2008, ninety-three percent of all known executions occurred in five countries:
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States).
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fendants, as only three countries, the United states being one of them,
have reportedly executed mentally retarded defendants since 1995.1"8
Many countries have protested against the United States' executions of
mentally retarded defendants.109 Indeed, fifteen countries of the Euro-
pean Union filed a brief on behalf of Mr. Atkins, stating that the practice
of executing mentally retarded offenders was in opposition with the
world's view and caused friction between the United States and other
countries.110
3. Organization Consensus
Before Atkins, several organizations opposed the death penalty of the
mentally retarded."1 In Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that the
American Psychological Association (now the newly formed AAIDD),
108. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Death Penalty; Citing 'National
Consensus,' Justices Bar Death Penalty for Retarded Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002,
at Al ("Amnesty International reported that since 1995, only three countries were re-
ported to have executed mentally retarded people: Kyrgyzstan, Japan and the United
States, which the organization said had executed 35 mentally retarded defendants since the
court allowed states to reinstate the death penalty in 1976.").
109. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How THE DEATH PENALTY WEAKENS U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS 1 (2004), http://www.aclu.org/capital/intl/10619pub 200 4l 2O9 .
html (follow "Download" hyperlink) ("Europeans and other allies find such U.S. practices
as the execution of juvenile offenders, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded to be
particularly repugnant."). Also, more than 162 French officials sent a letter to the U.S.
Congress asking for a moratorium on the death penalty citing that it was profoundly affect-
ing the relationship between France and the United States. Id. at 7.
110. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Death Penalty; Citing 'National
Consensus,' Justices Bar Death Penalty for Retarded Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002,
at Al.
The 15 countries of the European Union filed a brief on behalf of Mr. Atkins, as did a
group of senior American diplomats who told the court that the practice of executing
retarded offenders was out of step with much of the world and was a source of friction
between the United States and other countries. Id.
In addition to this letter, there have been numerous other times that foreign countries have
pleaded with the United States to end the death penalty. Id.; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, How THE DEATH PENALTY WEAKENS U.S. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS 8 (2004),
http://www.aclu.org/capital/intl/10619pub 200 4l 2O9 .html (follow "Download" hyperlink)
(illustrating the European Union's attempts to convince the U.S. Congress, and then Texas
Governor George W. Bush, to stop executions or face the possibility that it could hurt
economic relations). "After describing the strong opposition in Europe to the death pen-
alty, the letter noted the officials' concern that 'the almost universal repugnance' felt in
other countries for the continued application of the death penalty in the United States
could have economic consequences." AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How THE DEATH
PENALTY WEAKENS U.S. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS 8 (2004), http://www.aclu.org/capital/
intl/10619pub20041209.html (follow "Download" hyperlink).
111. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting that several organizations oppose the
death penalty).
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European Union, and religious communities representing the Christian,
Jewish, Muslim, Catholic and Buddhist traditions all oppose the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.112
After Ford and Atkins, scholars in the psychology and legal fields be-
gan advocating for a categorical exemption for mentally ill individuals
similar to that created in Atkins.'13 In addition, professional mental
health organizations are largely opposed to the practice of executing
mentally ill offenders. 114 For example, in 2004, the APA released a posi-
tion statement asserting that defendants should not be sentenced to death
or executed if, "at the time of the offense, they had a severe mental disor-
der or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreci-
ate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to
exercise rational judgment in relation to their conduct, or (c) to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the law".' 5
The American Bar Association has also been involved in the national
dialogue about executing the mentally ill and they have created a propo-
sal for legislatures and the nation to follow. 1 16 The ABA's proposal em-
braces the language of the American Association of Mental Retardation
and the American Psychiatric Associate's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders.'1 7 Amnesty International" 8 has also been in-
112. Id. (citing various position statements and briefs stating the positions of organiza-
tions opposed to the death penalty).
113. See Stephanie Zywein, Executing the Insane: A Look at Death Penalty Schemes in
Arkansas, Georgia and Texas, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 93, 99 (2007) ("Fol-
lowing the Ford and Atkins decisions, scholars in both the legal and psychology fields be-
gan to advocate for a similar categorical exemption for mentally ill individuals.").
114. See Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near? The Impact of
Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 508 (2007) ("Among professional mental health organizations,
there is abundant evidence that they are opposed to the practice of imposing the death
penalty on mentally ill offenders."). For example, the American Psychiatric Association
believes that if it is shown that the offender suffers from a mental disability that does not
allow him or her to appreciate the nature and consequences of the crime, rationally judge
the nature of his or her conduct, or mold his or her conduct to align with the law, then the
death penalty cannot be rightly asserted. Id.
115. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diminished Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: Position
Statement (2004), http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocu-
mentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200406.aspx.
116. See American Bar Association, Recommendation and Report on the Death Pen-
alty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668,
668 (2006) (stating in the preamble of the recommendation that the purpose of the recom-
mendation is to "urge each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to implement"
their recommended policies and procedures).
117. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the Death Penalty:
The ABA -IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133, 1334 (2005) (stat-
ing that the recommendation embraces the language of the AAIDD and APA which both
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strumental in the debate about the execution of the mentally ill and has
stated that the execution of the mentally ill or the "insane" is prohibited
by international law. n
9
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Although the Ford and Atkins decisions have mandated that mentally
ill and mentally retarded defendants are exempt from the death pen-
alty,12° the Supreme Court did not dictate in either case when states
should provide defendants with a mental health or competency evalua-
tion.121 As a result, states across the nation vary as to when they will hear
commonly agree that mental retardation must start before the age of eighteen but differ
with respect to how the adaptive part of the definition is worded). The AAIDD states that
mental retardation is "characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual function-
ing and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills." Id. The APA characterizes mental retardation as a person exhibiting "significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning (defined as an IQ of approximately 70 or below) and
concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning ... in at least two of the
following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and
safety." Id. (citing MICHAEL B. FIRST, ALLEN FRANCES & HAROLD A. PINCUS, THE Es-
SENTIAL COMPANION TO THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 382-83 (4th ed. 1995)).
118. AMNESTY INT'L, USA: THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 10
(2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/002/2006/en/dom-AMR51002200
6en.pdf (providing a description of Amnesty International's mission). Similar to its posi-
tions with juvenile and mentally retarded offenders, Amnesty International seeks to pro-
tect the mentally ill offenders from receiving the death penalty. Id. Amnesty International
also supports narrowing the extent of the death penalty as it implicates progress towards
abolition. Id. "[T]he organization will continue to seek to persuade all proponents of the
death penalty ... to change their minds and drop their support for any judicial killing at
all." Id.
119. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty Disregards Mental Illness, http://
www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/mentalillness.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009) ("The execu-
tion of those with mental illness or 'the insane' is clearly prohibited by international law").
Amnesty International also points out that "virtually every country in the world prohibits
the execution of people with mental illness." Id.
120. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10 (holding that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State
from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane"); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that because of "evolving standards of decency," men-
tally retarded defendants are categorically exempt from the death penalty).
121. See Cynthia A. Orpen, Comment, Following in the Footsteps of For&- Mental Re-
tardation and Capital Punishment Post-Atkins, 65 U. Prrr. L. REv. 83, 95 (2003) (pointing
out the procedural disparities that exist when it comes to capital sentencing guidelines for
people with mental disabilities). "Atkins neglected to set forth any requirements on how
or when the issue of mental retardation is to be decided in a capital case." Id. See gener-
ally Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (holding only that the execution of the severely mentally ill is un-
constitutional, while not stating when or how that decision should be made by the courts).
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a defendant's claim with regard to mental retardation or illness.' 22 Nu-
merous states require a defendant to raise his mental retardation issue at
a pre-trial hearing.123 Other states address the defendant's mental retar-
dation issue during the sentencing phase of trial,124 or after the trial but
before the sentencing phase.12 5 In some states, once the prosecutor files
122. See Cynthia A. Orpen, Comment, Following in the Footsteps of Ford: Mental Re-
tardation and Capital Punishment Post-Atkins, 65 U. PrrT. L. REV. 83, 95-96 (2003) (stat-
ing how the Supreme Court's failure to set requirements on how or when the issue of
mental retardation is to be raised resulted in variations among the states). Some states
hear the defendant's mental retardation at a pre-trial hearing, some at the sentencing
phase of trial, and some before the sentencing phase but after the trial. Id.
123. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(d)(1) (West 1997) ("A defendant on trial for
capital murder shall raise the special sentencing provision of mental retardation by motion
prior to trial."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102 (2002) (stating that a defendant may al-
lege that he or she is mentally retarded, but must file such a motion ninety days prior to
trial); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-3(a)-(b) (West 2002) ("The defendant may file a petition
alleging that the defendant is an individual with mental retardation. The petition must be
filed no later than twenty (20) days before the omnibus date."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4623(a) (1994) (stating the issue of mental retardation can be brought by the county or
district attorney's filing of a notice to request a separate sentencing hearing to determine
whether the capital murder defendant should be sentenced to death); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.135 (West 1999) (stating that the determination of whether or not a defendant
will classify as mentally retarded has to be completed pretrial). N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-
20A-2.1(2002) ("Upon motion of the defense requesting a ruling that the penalty of death
be precluded under this section, the court shall hold a hearing, prior to conducting the
sentencing proceeding .... "); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005(c) (West 2008) (stating
that once there is a motion of the defendant "supported by appropriate affidavits, the court
may order a pretrial hearing to determine if the defendant is mentally retarded"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (West 2008) (discussing the procedures for a defendant to
allege mental retardation at the commission of an offense).
124. See Richardson v. Maryland, 598 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (holding
that mental retardation is properly determined by the trier of fact at the sentencing stage of
the proceedings, rather than pre-trial or even pre-sentencing hearings); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-7-131(c)(3) (West 1997) (stating that the determination of mental retardation occurs
by the jury during the sentencing phase of trial); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2)
(West 2002) (stating that after a special sentencing proceeding, if "the trier of fact finds
that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall
be death" unless the defendant is mentally retarded).
125. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(c)-(d) (1994) (stating that after a defendant is
convicted of capital murder, if the prosecutor files a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, the defendant's counsel may request a hearing on the defendant's mental retarda-
tion). "If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this section, the court determines that
the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall sentence the defendant as otherwise
provided by law, and no sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole shall be
imposed hereunder." Id.; Mo. STAT. ANN § 565.030.4 (West Supp. 2003) (claiming that the
purpose of having a separate case to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded
from that of the actual trial is to allow a jury to hear evidence that is relevant and necessary
to accurately decide punishment without being prejudiced by this information at the guilt
or innocence portion of a trial); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(5) (Supp. 2002) (stating that
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his "intent to seek the death penalty," the defendant is appointed "a
prescreening psychological expert to determine the defendant's IQ.'126
In all but the last method, the burden is on the defendant, via his attor-
ney, to raise the issue of the defendant's mental incompetency or retarda-
tion. This is where the problem lies. As this Comment will illustrate,
both mentally retarded and mentally ill defendants face adversity in rais-
ing the issue of their mental health because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
A. Counsel's Obligation to Investigate Mental Health Issues & Present
Mitigation Evidence
Criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel. 12
7
Rendering effective counsel requires attorneys to investigate into mitigat-
ing evidence and failure to do so can result in a finding that counsel acted
ineffectively in assisting their clients.128 In Strickland v. Washington, the
U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden on counsel to make reasonable
investigations into mitigating evidence or to "make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary. "129 Particularly, with
regard to a death sentence, Strickland holds that a defendant must show
"first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and, second, that the de-
ficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial."13 The Strickland case spoke broadly about counsel's duty
if a "jury renders a verdict finding the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances"
and the defendant waives the right to a jury determination of the alleged aggravating cir-
cumstances, the court, upon a motion of the defense requesting a ruling that the death
sentence be prohibited, must hold a hearing on the defendant's mental retardation); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(c) (West 2000) (mandating that a trial court review the issue of a
capital defendant's mental retardation "upon the motion of the defense requesting a ruling
that the penalty of death be precluded" and "prior to conducting the sentencing
proceeding").
126. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(B) (2003) ("If the state files a notice of in-
tent to seek the death penalty, the court, unless the defendant objects, shall appoint a
prescreening psychological expert in order to determine the defendant's intelligence quo-
tient using current community, nationally and culturally accepted intelligence testing
procedures.").
127. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that a defendant has to right to "Assistance of
Counsel for his defense"); see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)
("[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.").
128. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that counsel "has
a duty to reasonably investigate or to make reasonable decisions that make investigation
unnecessary").
129. Id.
130. Id. at 669 (holding that the defendant in a death sentence case must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that deficiency prejudiced the defense leaving the
defendant without a chance for a fair trial).
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to investigate into mitigating circumstances and did not specifically elabo-
rate on counsel's duty to investigate into the defendant's mental
health.' 3 ' However, other Supreme Court cases provide guidance with
regard to counsel's duty to investigate mitigating evidence. Particularly,
the Supreme Court has recognized that in a capital case, counsel has a
duty to investigate into what mitigating evidence is available.132 The Su-
preme Court has also held that counsel's investigations into mitigating
evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that
may be introduced by the prosecutor., 133 Based on the U.S. Supreme
Court's holdings, it is clear that Strickland encompasses investigating into
the defendant's mental health because mental health is a mitigating factor
that could prevent the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant, 34
and the Court held that counsel has the duty to investigate.
135
131. Id. at 691 (commenting on counsel's duty to reasonably investigate). The Court
further noted that in any ineffectiveness case, a decision by counsel not to investigate must
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances and the Court will give
great deference to counsel's judgments. Id. However, in Strickland, one of the defendant's
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel was that counsel unreasonably failed to raise the
issue of his mental illness. Id. at 676. The Court found that counsel was not ineffective in
choosing not to raise this issue because reports at the trial court did not indicate a major
mental illness and that while the defendant was chronically depressed because of his eco-
nomic situation, the defendant "was not under the influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance." Id.
132. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (finding counsel ineffective for
not thoroughly conducting a background investigation on the defendant).
133. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) ("The ABA Guidelines provide that
investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be
introduced by the prosecutor."' (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINT-
MENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 93 (1989),
http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/1989Guidelines.pdf)). The Supreme
Court went on to say "[in evaluating petitioner's claim, this Court's principal concern is
not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case, but whether the investigation
supporting their decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' background was
itself reasonable." Id. at 511.
134. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10 (holding the "Eighth Amendment prohibits a State
from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane"); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded defendants are categorically ex-
empt from the death penalty).
135. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 705 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (referring to the broad duty
of counsel to investigate into any mitigating evidence in their defendant's case). In his
concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Justice Brennan stressed the importance
of counsel to investigate into mitigating evidence in death penalty cases. Id. Justice Bren-
nan explained that because death penalty cases are so different from all other punishments,
it requires a higher degree of reliability and the sentencer, in capital cases, shall be permit-
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Furthermore, subsequent cases explicitly address an attorney's duty to
reasonably investigate into a defendant's mental health. In Moore v.
Johnson'3 6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that counsel's failure
to investigate a mental deficiency when there was reason to believe the
defendant suffered from a mental deficiency, rendered the counsel's assis-
tance ineffective.' 37 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that counsel was ineffective where there was otherwise reason to
believe mental deficiency was an important defense and counsel did not
raise it as a defense.' 38 Essentially, this case law demonstrates that de-
fense counsel will ultimately decide whether a mental deficiency will be
brought to the attention of the court.' 39
This is a problem because many inmates diagnosed with mental retar-
dation who are facing the death penalty were not identified as having a
mental deficiency until after they were sentenced to death 4 ° and five to
ten percent of people on death row have a serious mental illness. 4 '
ted to consider all relevant mitigating factors. Id. This makes counsel's duty to investigate
supremely important in death penalty cases. Id. at 706.
136. 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cr. 1999).
137. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 621 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that counsel was
ineffective in investigating into Moore's background). Moore's background included child-
hood abuse, "tortured family background" and mental impairment. Id. at 602, 616-17.
138. See Mauldin v. Wainwright, 723 F.2d 799, 800 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that attor-
ney failed to effectively assist the defendant because the attorney failed to "have his client
examined by a psychiatric expert" and failed to fully investigate the defendant's medical
history).
139. See Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the trial
court relies on counsel to bring up the defendant's mental status).
140. See Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating
Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DIsABILrry L. REP. 529, 529-30 (1998) (emphasizing that clues about the defen-
dant such as apathy toward defense decisions, obvious misunderstanding or misjudgment,
difficulty explaining important and relevant elements, deferment to authority figures, and
an inability to communicate accurate or detailed information merits an investigation by
counsel into the possible existence of mental retardation). "By not presenting information
that their defendant has mental retardation, defense lawyers are ignoring a vital piece of
information." Id. at 530.
141. American Civil Liberties Union, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the
United States, http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/10617pub20050131.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2009) (estimating that five to ten percent of inmates on death row have a
severe mental illness). "Over 60 people diagnosed as mentally ill or with mental retarda-
tion have been executed in the United States since 1983." Id. Most of the damaged brains
of death row inmates are "due to illness or trauma, and most were victims of vicious beat-
ings and sexual abuse as children." Id.; See AMNESTY INT'L, USA: THE ExEcUtnON OF
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 9 (2006), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/002/
2006/en/dom-AMR510022006en.pdf. ("The National Association of Mental Health has es-
timated that [5] to 10[%] of the U.S. death row population have serious mental illness.").
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B. Causes of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
There are two primary causes for counsel's failure to identify their cli-
ent's mental retardation: first, the mentally retarded or ill defendants
often mask their symptoms and second, defense counsel often make sig-
nificant errors in judgment.
1. Defendants Mask Their Symptoms
a. Mentally Retarded Defendant's "Cloak of Competency"
Mentally retarded defendants often mask their symptoms by using a
"cloak of competency." '142 The "cloak of competency" is a term used to
refer to individuals suffering from mental retardation who have learned
to hide their disability through various adaptations and masking skills.' 4 3
Essentially, the cloak of competency is a method that individuals will use
to make them appear more competent than they are.1 44 For example, a
person with mental retardation will try to hide that he or she cannot read
or do basic arithmetic and take menial jobs that do not require higher
conceptual thinking.145 The cloak of competency is exacerbated by the
fact that "most people with mental retardation are not so profoundly dis-
abled that their condition is readily apparent., 146 This makes it difficult
for attorneys to discover that their client has mental retardation. 147 Es-
sentially, what the cloak of competency does in a judicial setting is it cre-
ates the problem of "cheating to lose." Cheating to lose is the idea that
The largest study of mental illness in homicide offenders occurred in Sweden, and it con-
cluded that one out of five homicide offenders suffered from mental illness. Id.
142. Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28
HUM. RTs. 9, 11 (2001), available at http:// www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer0l/fellner.html
("Many people who have cognitive impairments go to great lengths to mask them, wrap-
ping themselves in a 'cloak of competence."').
143. See id. (stating how the cloak of competence can be used by mentally retarded
individuals to hide their disability).
144. See Diane Courselle, Mark Watt & Donna Sheen, Suspects, Defendants, and Of-
fenders with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, 1 Wyo. L. REV. 1, 23 (2001) (stating that the
mentally retarded will use a cloak of competency to try to appear more competent than
they are). Individuals may also try use the cloak of competence to "deny any history of
difficulty in school, or fail to reveal any lack of understanding of papers presented to
them." Id.
145. See Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28
HUM. RTS. 9, 11 (2001), available at http:// www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer0l/fellner.html.
146. Id. ("Most people with mental retardation are not so profoundly disabled that
their condition is readily apparent; except in special cases such as Down's syndrome, they
do not look different from anyone else.").
147. See id. (stating that as a result of the cloak of competency, defense counsel often
do not realize that their clients are mentally retarded).
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the defendant's use of the cloak of competency actually hinders him in his
trial rather than helps him.148
Also adding to the problem of the cloak of competency is the fact that
"most laypersons underestimate the possible existence of mental retarda-
tion, thinking that anyone with mental retardation is virtually incapable
of almost any self-care," finding it hard to believe that mentally retarded
individuals can "drive, work, take the bus, and perform simple tasks with
relative ease.' 149 Unfortunately, with regard to understanding mental re-
tardation, many attorneys could be considered laypersons because few
attorneys have a background in evaluating or testing mental retarda-
tion15° and rarely consider that mentally retarded individuals will try to
hide their disability.151
The phenomenon of the cloak of competency was illustrated in a 2007
Texas case, Hunter v. State.'52 In Hunter, the testifying psychologist ex-
plained how the defendant wore a cloak of competency to mask his symp-
toms of mental retardation and hide his deficits in adaptive and
intellectual functioning. 153 The psychologist pointed out that as part of
the defendant's cloak of competency, the defendant denied ever attend-
148. See Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating
Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 530 (1998) (stating that the cloak of competency creates
the "cheating to lose" problem where the "defendant with mental retardation deflects at-
tention from his or her disabilities rather than bringing it to the attention of his or her
lawyer or the court"). In an attempt to maintain the image of "normal," some defendants
with mental disabilities will go to great lengths to keep quiet, agree with others, and hide
their disability "while failing to appreciate the disadvantages of hiding [them]." Id.
149. See id. (adding that many lay persons think that people's mental disabilities
would be "obvious"). Due to this false belief, defendants who suffer from mild retardation
"present the greatest obstacle to lawyers, the criminal justice system, and even their own
defense." Id.
150. See LaJuana Davis, Intelligence Testing and Atkins: Considerations for Appellate
Courts and Appellate Lawyers, 5 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 297, 307 (2003) (advocating for
the increased use of experts to help identify and test for developmental disabilities by stat-
ing that "few judges, court personnel, lawmakers, or lawyers have any background in
mental retardation evaluations or testing protocols").
151. See Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating
Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 530 (1998) (stating that lawyers, judges, and jurists
rarely consider that people with mental retardation will try to hide their disability). "De-
fendants who have mental retardation are often characterized as quiet and cooperative.
By attempting to 'look like' persons of average ability, they are masking their disabilities
because of the associated stigma of retardation." Id.
152. 243 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
153. Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("Garnett explained
that appellant wears a 'cloak of competence' that masks his deficits in intellectual function-
ing and adaptive behavior.").
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ing special education classes.1 54 The defendant also told the psychologist
that "he had learned to use a computer in prison, but he actually had
taken only a basic keyboarding class," and had stated that he could "fix
things at home" when in reality all he would do is tighten a loose
doorknob.15
5
b. Mentally Ill Defendants Masking of Symptoms
Similar to the mentally retarded defendant's use of the cloak of compe-
tency, mentally ill defendants may also mask their illness.'56 Mentally ill
individuals often choose to hide their symptoms because of the stigma
associated with their illness. 157 Their fear of stigmatization is not un-
founded because harsh stigmatization of the mentally ill occurs through-
out the world. 1 58 While masking their symptoms protects them from the
stigmatization they fear, as with the cloak of competency, this masking
can make it difficult for attorneys to identify that their clients have a
mental illness.159
154. Id. at 670 (exemplifying tactics the accused utilized to cover his condition).
155. Id. (reporting on the psychologist's observations on the defendant's use of the
cloak of competency).
156. See Andrea Stier & Stephen P. Hinshaw, Explicit and Implicit Stigma Against
Individuals with Mental Illness, 42 AUSTRAL. PSYCHOLOGIST 106, 108 (2007) ("In their
attempts to avoid detection and discrimination, individuals who possess a concealable
stigma may expend a large amount of energy to hide characteristics that might identify
them as belonging to the stigmatized category, and such mental efforts may backfire at
personal and social levels."). Attempting to conceal one's mental illness can inhibit "inti-
macy, friendship, support, and likeability," and thus enhance the symptoms that individual
is attempting to hide. Id.
157. See id. at 106 (stating that the mentally ill will try to avoid being labeled as men-
tally ill to avoid discrimination).
158. Id. (reporting that mental illness is harshly stigmatized across nations and
cultures).
159. See MARIA KARRAS, EMILY MCCARRON, ABIGAIL GRAY & SAM ARDASINSKI,
ON THE EDGE OF JUSTICE: THE LEGAL NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH A MENTAL ILLNESS IN
NSW 115 (2006), http://xml.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articlelDs/CB05FD97AAF2458C
CA25718E00014293/$file/EdgeOfJustice.pdf (expressing the need for attorneys to know
whether their clients suffer from a mental illness).
"Consultations for this study indicate that if a person does not disclose that they [sic]
have a mental illness, it may be difficult for legal service providers to identify that a
person has a mental illness. Several legal and non-legal service providers suggested
that this may be because it is not overtly apparent that a person has an illness." Id.
(footnote omitted). "Legal service providers may not always be able to identify that a
client has a mental illness, which may result in a person not receiving the time, assis-
tance and understanding they need to resolve their legal issue." Id; see also Randal 1.
Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 927, 928 (2001) (stating that mental illnesses "are difficult to diag-
nose and are not usually readily apparent").
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Adding to the probability that counsel will have difficulty discovering
their client's mental illness is the fact that, like mental retardation, mental
illnesses are not always readily apparent at the outset. 160 Even severe
mental illnesses like schizophrenia will not consistently present symptoms
and may manifest at different times throughout the illness. 161 This cre-
ates a unique problem for attorneys dealing with a mentally ill defendant
versus a mentally retarded defendant. Attorneys representing a mentally
ill individual have an added factor that could prevent them from discover-
ing the illness that does not exist with mental retardation. Counsel may
not discover a defendant's mental retardation because the client is hiding
the symptoms or because the attorney does not know how to identify the
symptoms. However, with mental illness, the attorney may not discover
the mental illness for an added third reason, that the mental illness is not
manifested at the moment.
2. Counsel's Error in Judgment
Counsel becoming alert to their client's mental health is the first hurdle
that defendants must cross in alerting the courts to their retardation or
illness. After counsel is aware, then the defendants also face the risk that
their attorneys will fail to raise the issue of their retardation because of
the attorney's negligence or incompetence. The following cases are ex-
amples of counsel failing to raise the issue of their client's mental illness
or retardation
a. Counsel's Failure to Investigate
In Jells v. Mitchell162, defendant Jells was sentenced, in 1987, to twenty-
five years imprisonment for kidnapping and sentenced to death for mur-
der.163 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that counsel
160. See id. (discussing ways in which a mentally ill individual can prevent discrimina-
tion commonly associated with stereotypical attitudes and stating that mental illnesses "are
difficult to diagnose and are not usually readily apparent"); see also Angela F. Epps, To
Pay or Not to Pay, That Is the Question: Should SSI Recipients Be Exempt from Child
Support Obligations?, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 63, 97 (2002) ("Some disabilities, particularly
mental illnesses, will not be readily apparent.").
161. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) ("[E]ven in cases of severe
mental illness such as schizophrenia, symptoms are not actively present or observable all
the time; at different times over the course of the illness, symptoms spontaneously remit,
even when clients are not medicated."). Those mental problems that are less easily identi-
fied include thoughts of suicide, eating disorders and depression. Id.
162. 538 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2008).
163. Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 486 (6th Cit. 2008) (describing the procedural his-
tory in which Jells was sentenced to imprisonment for kidnapping charges and sentenced to
death for an aggravated felony murder charge).
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was ineffective for failing to investigate into mitigating evidence with re-
gard to Jells's mental health."6 Counsel had failed to conduct an exten-
sive investigation with family members resulting in counsel not
discovering the significant abuse Jells suffered as a child. 65 Counsel also
did not obtain a psychological report prior to trial, and "failed to obtain
accessible school records-reports that would demonstrate that Jells had
mental impairments, including learning difficulties that led to disruptions
in the classroom and an extremely low reading level." '1 66
The court found that counsel's limited investigation into the client's
home and academic background was insufficient and that "counsel's
awareness of Jells's unstable home environment and academic difficulties
should have alerted them that further investigation by a mitigation spe-
cialist might prove[ ] fruitful. ' 167 Essentially, this court held that once an
attorney uncovers evidence indicating a possibility of mental illness or
retardation the attorney must investigate further and not abandon that
potential mitigating evidence.
In Brownlee v. Hayle168 , defense counsel was also found ineffective for
failing to investigate into mitigation evidence regarding the defendant's
borderline mental retardation, psychiatric disorders and history of drug
and alcohol abuse.1 69 In Brownlee, the defendant was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to death. 7° The Supreme Court of Alabama found
that while his conviction was correct, he was denied effective assistance of
164. Id. at 494 (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to use a mitigation
specialist). Counsel had requested one but "never followed through on their request by
formally involving her in the case." Id.
165. Id. at 493.
Jells's counsel interviewed only three family members, neglecting to speak with many
other family members who had lived with Jells and were available. When speaking
with the family members they did contact, their inquiry was brief and they failed to
ask sufficiently probing questions; as a result they failed to discover the abuse that
Jells received from his mother's live-in boyfriend and his stepfather. Id.
166. Id. (listing the failures of counsel and finding that those failures made counsel
ineffective). Not only did Jells's counsel not consult a mitigating specialist, but they also
failed to gather "the evidence that such a specialist would typically collect." Id. at 494.
167. Id. at 496 (stating that counsel's limited investigation into the defendant's home
life should have alerted them that further investigation was necessary when they found out
that that the defendant had an unstable childhood and academic difficulties). The court
held that their limited investigation was a failure by counsel to fulfill their duty to investi-
gate. Id.
168. 309 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2002).
169. Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 2002).
170. Id. at 1045 ("Virgil Lee Brownlee appeals the district court's denial of his peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus challenging both his 1987 conviction for the murder of
Lathen Aaron Dodd and the death sentence imposed as a result of that conviction by the
Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama.").
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counsel in the sentencing phase; therefore, the court ordered a remand of
the case with instructions to issue a writ vacating Brownlee's death sen-
tence.'71 During the sentencing phase of trial, Brownlee's defense coun-
sel presented no evidence and only offered a brief closing argument.
172
In fact, at the first sentencing hearing, defense counsel assumed that the
defendant would be found guilty and just asked the jury not to sentence
him to death.173 Counsel did not have any evidence in their hands about
Brownlee's mental retardation and mental illness because they did not
investigate, and therefore, had little material available to help their client.
In the second sentencing hearing for Brownlee, the judge suggested to
counsel that they should contact a clinical psychologist and request an
examination of Brownlee. Counsel contacted the psychologist and
presented his testimony during the second sentencing trial. 175 The psy-
chologist testified that Brownlee had "a mixed substance abuse disorder,"
combined with a "mixed personality disorder, and borderline intellectual
functioning" with an IQ of 70, all of which classified Brownlee as men-
tally impaired. 176 The psychologist also testified that Brownlee suffered
from "hypnagogic hallucinations," which consist of "experiences right
before you fall asleep or right upon awakening of seeing threatening
171. Id. at 1045-46.
Although we agree with the district court that the underlying conviction was constitu-
tionally firm, Brownlee plainly received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing
in light of his attorneys' failure to investigate, obtain, or present to the jury any evi-
dence in mitigation of the death penalty, violating the Sixth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order regarding sentencing and
remand the case with instructions to issue a writ vacating Brownlee's death sentence.
Id.
172. Id. at 1051 ("At the sentencing hearing before the jury, Brownlee's counsel
presented no evidence. Instead, each of his lawyers offered only a very brief closing
argument.").
173. Id. at 1051-52 (reporting on the brief closing arguments of counsel). Counsel
stated, "I am not going to rehash or go back over the trial. You have obviously resolved the
issue of guilt against us. I am simply standing up here before you at this time to ask for
Virgil Brownlee's life." Id. Counsel also told the jury that the other defendant in the case
was not receiving the death penalty and asked for the jury to spare Brownlee's life because
he is human. Id.
174. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1052 ("Prior to the second phase of the sentencing pro-
ceeding, Judge Hard suggested that defense counsel contact Dr. William Beidleman, a
clinical psychologist, to conduct an examination of Brownlee.").
175. Id. ("At the February 24, 1987 judicial sentencing hearing, the defense presented
Dr. Beidleman and two of Brownlee's sisters as witnesses.").
176. Id. (stating that the psychologist, Dr. Beidleman, classified the defendant as hav-
ing borderline intellectual functioning, "which is out of the retarded range, but still
impaired").
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figures or animals." '177 He also observed physical symptoms that may
have indicated that Brownlee suffered from psychosis. 78 After present-
ing the psychologist's testimony, defense counsel presented the testimony
of Brownlee's two sisters; they stated defendant was taken to a psychiat-
ric hospital after leaving the military; had seizures when he was around
twenty years old; and had a history of harming himself, including jumping
out of windows, and cutting himself on his chest.'7 9 After the presenta-
tion of all this testimony, the trial court found that there were not mitigat-
ing factors and sentenced Brownlee to death.18°
Brownlee then filed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserting
that his counsel failed to prepare adequately during the sentencing phase
of his trial.181 The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the failure of
counsel to investigate into the mitigating evidence of the defendant's
mental illness and retardation caused them to be unable to present any
evidence to the jury. 82 The court found that counsel's failure to investi-
gate prevented the jury from considering anything about his "borderline
mental retardation, his schizotypal personality disorder, his antisocial
personality disorder, his many drug and alcohol dependencies, or his his-
tory of seizures." 183 It therefore reversed and remanded the case, in-
177. Id. ("Based on Brownlee's statements and interviews with Brownlee's sisters, Dr.
Beidleman reported that Brownlee had seen visions and suffered from 'hypnagogic halluci-
nations,' which consist of 'experiences right before you fall asleep or right upon awakening
of seeing threatening figures or animals."').
178. Id. (stating that Dr. Beidleman observed the defendant's "physical complaints
such as hot flashes in the chest, which 'were sort of strange and often go along with psycho-
sis."'). While noting all these symptoms, the psychologist did state that it was possible that
Brownlee exaggerated his symptoms in order to be seen in a negative light. Id.
179. Brownlee, 309 F.3d at 1053 (reporting how one of the defendant's sisters testified
that her brother had seizures and would try to hurt himself which "included forcing family
members out of the apartment and harming himself by jumping out the window and cut-
ting himself in the chest"). In fact, Brownlee may have exhibited suicidal tendencies be-
cause "[blefore trying to harm himself, Brownlee complained about headaches and said
that 'he couldn't take the pain anymore."' Id.
180. Id. (stating how the trial court found aggravating factors but not mitigating fac-
tors with regard to Brownlee's conviction of murder).
181. Id. at 1051 (stating that the defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel
because his counsel failed to prepare adequately for the guilt/innocence phase of his trial).
Brownlee also asserted that his counsel failed "by committing various unprofessional er-
rors during that proceeding." Id.
182. Id. at 1067 ("Because counsel's failure to investigate, obtain, or present any evi-
dence of mitigating circumstances to the sentencing jury constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel, Brownlee is entitled to habeas corpus relief and a new sentencing proceeding
consistent with the Sixth Amendment's command that a defendant receive the effective
assistance of counsel.").
183. Id. at 1074.
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structing the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus vacating
Brownlee's death sentence.
1 8 4
In Jells and Brownlee, counsel's failures to investigate prevented them
from discovering vital evidence on the defendant's mental illness and re-
tardation and lead to subsequent failure in failing to introduce key expert
witness testimony. This leads to the next critical error that defense coun-
sel make when representing their capital defendants: neglecting to utilize
experts and present their testimony in court.
b. Counsel's Failure to Utilize Experts
In Jells, counsel was also found ineffective for failing to call a mitiga-
tion expert. 1 5 In Jells, the Sixth Circuit found that while counsel does
not have an obligation to hire a mitigation expert, counsel does have an
obligation to investigate the possible mitigation evidence.1 8 6 However,
the court then found that in Ohio, for counsel to be found competent in a
capital case, they must present, in court, the mitigation evidence that
"would present a sympathetic picture of the defendant's family, social,
and psychological background."18 7 Effectively, the court found that
counsel should have introduced the expert's testimony regarding the de-
fendant's mental health in order to adequately represent the capital
defendant.
In Head v. Thomasonl s ', the defendant, Gary Chad Thomason, "shot
and killed the homeowner who came upon him while he was burglarizing
In this case, counsel's absolute failure to investigate, obtain, or present any evidence,
let alone the powerful, concrete, and specific mitigating evidence that was available,
prevented the jurors from hearing anything at all about the defendant before them.
An individualized sentence, as required by the law, was therefore impossible. Instead,
the jury was asked to decide Virgil Brownlee's fate without hearing anything about his
borderline mental retardation, his schizotypal personality disorder, his antisocial per-
sonality disorder, his many drug and alcohol dependencies, or his history of seizures.
Id.
184. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1080.
185. Jells, 538 F.3d at 494 (concluding that Jells's counsel was ineffective for failing to
use a mitigation specialist).
186. Id. at 495 ("While Jells's counsel did not have a specific obligation to employ a
mitigation specialist, they did have an obligation to fully investigate the possible mitigation
evidence available."). This evidence helps "determine whether a sentence of death is ap-
propriate." Id.
187. See id. at 495-96 ("Thus, to provide professionally competent assistance in Ohio
capital cases, defense counsel must conduct a reasonably thorough investigation into all
possible mitigation evidence that would present a sympathetic picture of the defendant's
family, social, and psychological background.").
188. 578 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 2008).
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the victim's home.' 189 In 1997, Thomason was convicted and sentenced
to death for "malice murder, burglary and possession of a firearm by
felon during commission of a burglary."' 190 After his conviction, Thoma-
son filed for writ of habeas corpus, which the court denied on all grounds
except for the defendant's allegation that he was not afforded the effec-
tive assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of the trial.191 The
warden and Thomason appealed and the Supreme Court of Georgia
heard the case. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that counsel
was ineffective for failing to call experts who could have testified about
the mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental health.192 Counsel ne-
glected to call two mental health experts or present the mitigating evi-
dence related to their findings. 93 One of the experts would have testified
about Thomason's low IQ and the other would have testified about
Thomason's intellectual impairment, school, medical, and institutional
records.'
94
The court stated that trial counsel was aware of the need for expert
testimony and had even asked the court for an additional $25,000 for
mental health expert assistance but the court denied it.19 5 The court held
that this denial should have not prevented the attorneys from presenting
the expert testimony.' 96 Additionally, the court stated that defense coun-
sel should have obtained an affidavit instead or spoken to the expert
about reducing his fee.' 97 In fact, the expert stated that he would have
found ways to make conducting his evaluation cheaper but was never
189. Head v. Thomason, 578 S.E.2d 426, 428 (Ga. 2003) (describing the events that
lead to the criminal trial in this case).
190. Id.
191. Id. ("[Thomason's] petition was denied on all grounds save one-that he was not
afforded the effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his bench trial
because trial counsel failed to investigate Thomason's background adequately and failed to
present an effective case in mitigation.").
192. Id.
We conclude, given the importance of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases, that
an attorney has not acted reasonably when he fails to call mental health experts he
knows have mitigating evidence and explains his failure to present lay mitigation evi-
dence by asserting that he had not experts to call. Id.
193. Id. at 429-30.
194. Head, 578 S.E.2d at 429-30 (stating how the defense counsel knew of two experts
who could have testified about the defendant's mental health issues but failed to do so).
195. Id. at 430 (stating how counsel "recognized the need for expert testimony").
196. Id.
197. Id. (noting that there were other means for counsel to introduce the expert's
testimony that would not have required spending $25,000, such as contacting the expert
and using an affidavit, and that counsel did not do so).
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contacted by defense counsel to discuss that possibility. 198 Stressing the
importance of mitigating evidence in a death penalty case, the court
found counsel ineffective for failing to obtain an affidavit or discuss re-
ducing the expert's costs. 199
From these two cases, it is evident that courts place a high burden on
attorneys to utilize experts. Jells held that experts were necessary in or-
der for counsel to adequately represent a mentally retarded defendant
2 °
and Head v. Thomason held that counsel must find ways to obtain expert
testimony despite any financial restrictions.2 °1
c. Counsel's Failure to Raise the Issue
Even worse than not investigating and or presenting expert testimony
is counsel failing to initially raise the issue of the defendant's mental sta-
tus by neglecting to request a competency evaluation.
In an Illinois case, People v. Shanklin2 °2 , the court held that counsel
was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on the defendant's mental
status.2 °3 In Shanklin, after the defendant entered a guilty plea to at-
tempted murder, it was discovered that there was a pre-sentence report
which stated that the defendant had been hospitalized three times for
mental health problems as a teenager and that he was mentally retarded
and had problems retaining and understanding verbal information.
20 4
198. Id. ("The expert noted he could have reduced the cost by utilizing defense team
members to conduct interviews rather than conducing them himself and, had he had the
materials provided to him by habeas counsel, he would have been able assist in providing
evidence in mitigation.").
199. Head, 578 S.E.2d at 430 (noting the methods defense counsel should have em-
ployed to produce the expert testimony before the court).
200. Jells, 538 F.3d at 494 (holding that Jells's counsel was ineffective for failing to use
a mitigation specialist).
201. Head, 578 S.E.2d at 430 (concluding that an attorney does not act reasonably in a
death penalty case when "he fails to call mental health experts he knows have mitigating
evidence").
202. 814 N.E.2d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
203. People v. Shanklin, 814 N.E.2d 139, 145 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
We find the gist of a constitutional claim was provided by defendant in his allegation
that he was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings; he should have had a
hearing to determine his fitness to enter a guilty plea, and he received ineffective
assistance when defense counsel failed to request such a hearing. Id.
204. Id. at 143 (stating how the defendant was admitted to a hospital for psychiatric
evaluation on three separate occasions as a teenager for violent and disruptive behavior;
that defendant had difficulty "receiving and retaining verbal information"; and that he had
a low IQ when he was hospitalized).
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In making its decision, the court noted the effects of the cloak of com-
petency.2 °5 The court stated that judges can be confronted by defendants
who are attempting to hide their mental disability and how mentally re-
tarded defendants can conceal their lack of comprehension of the trial.216
Because of this, the court stated that "it is incumbent on the attorney
representing a mentally retarded defendant to make this fact known to
the trial court and for the trial court to proceed with care in accepting a
plea.,2 07 While the court noted how judges may be affected by the defen-
dant's cloak of competency, it did not give leeway to counsel for the pos-
sible effects for the cloak of competency.208 The judge held that counsel
should have had notice, from a mental health report, before the sentenc-
ing phase of the trial, of the defendant's mental retardation and there-
fore, counsel was ineffective for failing to present that mitigating
evidence.20 9
Another example of counsel failing to raise the issue is in a 2005 case,
Burt v. Uchtman. ° In Burt v. Uchtman, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that counsel was ineffective in assisting a defendant in a
capital murder case for failing to raise the issue of the defendant's mental
health status by requesting a competency evaluation.211 At his trial, Burt
205. Id. at 144 ("A judge may be confronted with an individual who will attempt to
conceal his mental disability."). While the court did not term this a "cloak of competence,"
it fits under the definition because the cloak of competence is when a mentally retarded
individual tries to conceal his or her disability. See Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Execut-
ing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28 HUM. R-rS. 9, 11 (2001), available at http://
www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summerOl/fellner.html (defining the cloak of competency as a way
for mentally retarded individuals to mask their cognitive impairments). For example, indi-
viduals may use the cloak of competence to mask their "inability to read or do basic math."
Id.
206. People, 814 N.E.2d at 144 ("A cooperative defendant-particularly one who has
been in court before-could conceal his lack of comprehension.").
207. Id.
208. Id. at 144-45 (holding that defense counsel was ineffective despite the fact that
the court noted that the defendant may have been concealing his disability). Again, while
the court did not refer to the defendant's efforts to hide his disability as a cloak of compe-
tence, it fits that definition because the term cloak of competence refers to an individual's
efforts to hide their disability. See Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with
Mental Retardation, 28 HUM. Ri-s. 9, 11 (2001), available at http:// www.abanet.org/irr/hr/
summer0l/fellner.html (defining the "cloak of competence" as a technique used by people
to mask their mental disability).
209. Id. at 144 ("Even if defense counsel had not known of defendant's mental-health
history prior to entry of the plea, he was clearly on notice at the time of defendant's
sentencing.").
210. 422 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2005).
211. Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557, 568 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that counsel per-
formed deficiently because counsel did not request a renewed fitness hearing for the
defendant).
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originally plead "not guilty" but then changed his plea to "guilty" despite
the advice of his attorneys. His attorneys stated that they spoke with him
and advised him against pleading guilty but that he insisted on doing it
anyway. 12 The defendant, Burt, was subsequently sentenced to death for
the murders of two men.213
The court found that defense counsel's action in allowing their defen-
dant to plead guilty without first requesting a competency hearing made
counsel ineffective because counsel had notice of the defendant's mental
health status.21 4 The court held that counsel had notice of Burt's mental
health status based on a report they received eight months before trial215
and based on counsel's own observations of the defendant. 216 The report
that counsel received eight months before Burt plead guilty stated that
Burt had consistently been on anti-depressant and psychotropic drugs
while in pre-trial confinement but yet counsel still failed to request a
competency hearing.217 In fact, Burt had been on powerful psychotropic
medication for fourteen months between the time of his arrest and the
entering of his plea of guilty.218 It also stated that Burt was "scared of
212. Id. at 562.
213. Id. ("Ronald Burt was sentenced to death for the murders of H. Steven Roy and
Kevin Muto.").
214. Id. ("We conclude here that in light of the overwhelming evidence of Burt's psy-
chological problems and heavy medication, counsel's failure to request a new competency
hearing was deficient performance."). The court made this conclusion based on its finding
that "Burt's attorneys were aware of several pieces of information beyond what was availa-
ble to the trial court that should have alerted them to the need for a new competency
hearing." Id. at 567.
215. Id. at 568 (stating that, eight months before trial, the defendant was examined by
a psychologist to determine if he was competent to stand trial, and that while the psycholo-
gist report found the defendant competent to stand trial, it left many gaps which should
have alerted counsel as to the need to request a competency hearing).
216. Burt, 422 F.3d at 567-68 (noting how counsel's observations of the defendant's
conduct should have alerted them to the defendant's mental health problems). The court
stated that counsel had ample opportunity to observe Burt in and out of the courtroom
setting. Id. at 568. Counsel also admitted knowing that Burt did not comprehend legal
advice and was not acting rationally. Id. at 562.
217. Id. at 568 ("Counsel should have realized that Dr. Pearson's report left critical
questions unanswered because Dr. Pearson failed to consider that Burt was taking multiple
psychotropic medications."). The court went on to state that "the report could not have
addressed Burt's current psychological condition because of the numerous changes made
to his prescriptions in the eight months between the examination and the start of trial." Id.
218. Id. at 559. Burt was on Doxepein which "affects chemicals in the brain that may
become unbalanced and cause depression." Id. at 560 nl. Burt was also on Diazepam
which "affects chemicals in the brain that may become unbalanced and cause anxiety,
seizures and muscle spasms." Id. at 560 n2. Burt was also on Imipramine which "affects
chemicals in the brain that may become unbalanced and cause depression." Id. at 560 n3.
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imaginary snakes in his cell., 219
Counsel's observations also put them on notice of Burt's possible
mental illness. 220 First, counsel should have been aware of Burt's mental
illness from their own observation that he exhibited "frequent swings of
mood" and often "demonstrated belligerent or explosive behavior" in
front of counsel.221 Indeed, one defense counsel even admitted that he
knew that Burt probably did not comprehend legal advice and was not
acting rationally.222 Second, and even worse, counsel also knew Burt pri-
marily wanted to plead guilty because he wanted to smoke and he could
not smoke at the county jail where he was located whereas he could at
the state prison where he would go if he plead guilty.223 The court stated
that Burt's desire to have a cigarette more than defend himself against
capital charges should have alerted counsel that he was not acting ration-
ally.224 Furthermore, the court found that counsel had no tactical reason
for not presenting this evidence and was therefore ineffective for not do-
ing So.225 Based on all this information, the court stated, "when there is a
sudden guilty plea with no attempt to seek concessions from the prosecu-
tion, [it] may, when coupled with other evidence of mental problems,
raise doubts as to the defendant's competency. ,226
While the Seventh Circuit found counsel ineffective for failing to re-
quest a competency hearing, it also admonished the trial court for not
raising the issue sua sponte. 227 The Seventh Circuit opined that the trial
court "never should have accepted Burt's guilty plea without first order-
ing a renewed competency hearing" because the court knew that Burt
was taking large doses of powerful psychotropic medications, that Burt
219. Id. at 561 (explaining that before Burt's psychological examination to determine
competency, the officials in the prison "refused to dispense his medications because, in
Burt's words, they did not want him 'doped up' for the examination").
220. Id. (noting that counsel was aware of the defendant's behavior from his actions
inside and outside the courtroom).
221. Burt, 422 F.3d at 568 (describing counsel's observations of Burt as belligerent,
explosive, and violent).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 567 ("Burt insisted on changing his plea to guilty largely because he was
not permitted to smoke in the Stephenson County Jail, and was anxious to return to prison
where smoking was permitted.").
224. Id. ("That Burt's desire to have a cigarette, in counsel's mind, trumped his desire
to defend himself against capital murder charges should have suggested to counsel that
Burt was not thinking clearly and not making rational decisions to assist in his defense.").
225. Id. at 568 (Neither the respondent nor Burt's former attorneys provided any con-
ceivable tactical reason for counsel's decision not to request a new competency hearing.").
226. Burt, 422 F.3d at 565 (citing United States v. Johns, 728 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir.
1984)).
227. Id. at 566 ("If ever there was a case in which a trial court should have sua sponte
ordered a renewed competency hearing, this is the case.").
[Vol. 11:413
MENTALLY ILL CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
was having trouble remaining alert and that Burt had a significantly lower
than average intelligence.22 8 The Seventh Circuit also held that the trial
court should have been alerted to Burt's possible incompetency from
Burt's unexplained decision to plead guilty against counsel's advice.2 29
In the end, counsel's failure to raise the issue of Burt's mental illness
did not result in his death because the Governor of Illinois granted clem-
ency to all death row inmates and his death sentence was commuted to a
life imprisonment. 3 °
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEFENSE COUNSEL
What is evident from all the above cases is that there are several ways
that counsel can fail to effectively represent their mentally retarded and
mentally ill clients. The above cases have also demonstrated that courts
play an important role in identifying mentally ill and mentally retarded
capital defendants. The next portion of this Comment is dedicated to
providing counsel and judges with recommendations on how to prevent
mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants from receiving the death
penalty in contravention to Ford and Atkins.
A. Education
First, attorneys should educate themselves by becoming aware of the
symptoms of mental illness and mental retardation by reading as much as
they can about these disabilities.23 1 This is extremely important because
attorneys do not have extensive training in detecting and working with
mentally ill or retarded individuals.23 2 A great source of information to
228. Id.
Dr. Pearson's report made the trial court fully aware that Burt was a man of signifi-
cantly below average intelligence with a history of psychological problems. The court
knew that Burt was taking large doses of powerful psychotropic medications and that
Dr. Pearson's report barely mentioned those drugs. The court also knew that at one
point during the trial Burt was having such difficulty remaining alert that his attorneys
felt compelled to request a continuance. Id.
229. Id. ("Lastly, Burt's sudden unexplained decision to plead guilty against the ad-
vice of counsel when he faced certain eligibility for the death penalty should have caused
the court to consider whether he was competent to make that decision.").
230. Id. at 559.
231. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (providing steps to effec-
tively manage mental health problems clients may exhibit). "The first step in effectively
managing any type of mental health problem is to recognize that it exists and understand
as much as possible." Id.
232. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 25 (2007) ("The criminal defense attor-
ney often does not have extensive background and training.., regarding how to deal with
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start learning about mental retardation is the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual, Fourth Edition, commonly known as DSM-IV 33 and the
AAIDD's definitions of mental retardation. 34 To begin learning about
mental illness counsel should consult the National Alliance on Mental
Illness's website.2 35
Another part of an attorney's education on mental retardation and
mental illness should include information about the stereotypes of mental
retardation and mental illness. A common stereotype about mental re-
tardation is that it is apparent from a person's physical appearance. 36 In
fact, many people assume that mentally retarded people must look like
they have Down syndrome for them to really have mental retardation.237
It is important that counsel realize that this is only a stereotype in order
clients who have mental illnesses, psychiatric diagnoses, and other impairments."). Attor-
neys do have extensive training in "law school, continuing education classes, courtrooms
and jails," but they lack the expertise of detecting and dealing with mental disorders. Id.
233. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (identifying sources for
information about mental health disorders and psychological problems). "One of the best
sources of information for identifying and understanding the nature of psychological
problems is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-
IV-TR)." Id.
234. See generally American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabili-
ties, Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition,
http://www.aamr.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonID.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (pro-
viding information on mental retardation).
235. See National Alliance on Mental Illness, About Mental Illness, http://
www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/InformYourself/About MentalIllness/About_
MentalIllness.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (defining mental illness and providing infor-
mation regarding mental illnesses).
Mental illnesses are medical conditions that disrupt a person's thinking, feeling, mood,
ability to relate to others, and daily functioning. Just as diabetes is a disorder of the
pancreas, mental illnesses are medical conditions that often result in a diminished ca-
pacity for coping with the ordinary demands of life .... Stigma erodes confidence that
mental disorders are real, treatable health conditions. We have allowed stigma and a
now unwarranted sense of hopelessness to erect attitudinal, structural and financial
barriers to effective treatment and recovery. It is time to take these barriers down. Id.
236. See Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for
the Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
701, 712 (2008) ("Many mistakenly believe that one can merely look at a person and tell
whether he is mentally retarded.").
237. See id. ("In fact, many jurors believe that a person with mental retardation looks
like someone with Down syndrome or has other facial indicia of his disability, even though
this is rarely the case."). This article focuses on juror's perceptions of the mentally re-
tarded. However, the above quote can be applied to all sorts of lay people including attor-
neys because they are often uneducated about the signs and symptoms of mental
retardation. See also Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Dis-
turbed Clients in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (stating that few
attorneys have received training on how to detect and work with mentally retarded cli-
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to avoid ignoring their client's mental retardation thereby overlooking
the defendant's other symptoms. 23 8 By realizing that physical appearance
is a stereotype and not a necessary indicator of mental retardation, attor-
neys can look for other clues, including but not limited to "apparent
'slowness,' vagueness in communicating details, and a seemingly poor un-
derstanding of the situation. "239 With regard to mental illness, attorneys
must confront the stereotype that the mentally ill always present symp-
toms. 240 By realizing that mental illness symptoms are not always pre-
sent, counsel can avoid overlooking their client's mental illness.2 41 In
addition, counsel's awareness that mental illness symptoms vary over the
course of time will allow them to consider the fact that the proper legal
course to take may vary as well. 4 2
ents). Mental health issues have the potential to significantly affect the outcome of the
case and the attorney-client relationship. Id.
238. See id. (stating that because symptoms of a client's mental disability are not al-
ways readily apparent, attorneys should conduct a thorough investigation into their client's
background so they do not overlook the client's mental disability). Investigation can in-
clude getting the client's medical history and talking to family members or close friends of
the client. Id.
239. George S. Baroff, Capital Cases, 22 CHAMPION 33, 33 (1998) ("Absent physical
abnormalities, as in Down syndrome (mongolism), the only clue to retardation may be
apparent 'slowness,' vagueness in communicating details, and a seemingly poor under-
standing of the situation.").
240. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (concluding that symptoms
of mental illness are not always readily observable).
While some forms of mental illness are readily observable (i.e., clients who are talking
to themselves, clients who are severely depressed), other forms of mental problems
are less obvious (i.e., suicidal thoughts, eating disorders, milder forms of depression
and anxiety). In addition, even in cases of severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia,
symptoms are not actively present or observable all the time; at different times over
the course of the illness, symptoms spontaneously remit, even when clients are not
medicated. Id.
241. See id. (stating that identifying that the client has a mental illness is the first step
to addressing and managing the problem of a client's mental disability). Since symptoms
of mental illness are not always present, it is a good idea to take a good case history of your
client so you can discover if they have a mental illness. Id.; see also George S. Baroff,
Capital Cases, 22 CHAMPION 33, 33 (1998) (noting how identifying mental disability is not
always possible physically, so defense attorneys should be "alert to the possibility of
mental retardation and initiate the diagnostic process by collecting school records and fam-
ily histories").
242. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) (recommending that a cli-
ent's mental status be continuously monitored).
[T]he stressful jail setting may exacerbate existing symptoms or cause a predisposed
mental health condition to surface. For example, incarceration may exacerbate an
underlying long-term depression to the point that the client is suicidal and cannot
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B. Gather Information
Next, when counsel takes on a capital client, they should gather as
much data as possible.2 43 The first way to do this is to observe the client
and see if the defendant exhibits any detectable symptoms of a mental
disability or disorder.2 44 However, counsel should not rely solely on his
or her own observations because these observations will be insufficient
compared to someone that is trained in screening for psychological and
mental disorders245 and attorneys are not trained in how to detect mental
disabilities.2 46
Another way of gathering information is to ask a multitude of ques-
tions that serve as indicators as to whether a client has a mental disabil-
ity.2 4 7 In doing so, counsel can directly ask questions to encourage the
client in disclosing his or her mental disability.248 For example, counsel
could note the defendant's symptom and ask the client if he or she has
seen a doctor or inquire into the client's particular feelings or behavior.249
Counsel can also ask the defendant other questions such as if the client
focus on the case or participate in the defense. Critically, a defendant's competency to
stand trial is not a fixed state. Rather, it may fluctuate as a function of the course of
illness, a response to treatment attempts and effects of medications, and a reaction to
his or her legal situation. Id.
243. See id. ("An attorney should gather as much collateral information as possible to
learn more about the client.").
244. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (stating that the first
method in detecting a client's mental illness is to observe the client).
245. See State Bar of Texas, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69
TEX. B. J. 966, 980 (2006) (stating that habeas counsel should not rely on their own obser-
vations of their capital defendants to detect mental disabilities).
246. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 25 (2007) ("The criminal defense attor-
ney often does not have extensive background and training, however, regarding how to
deal with clients who have mental illnesses, psychiatric diagnoses, and other
impairments.").
247. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008).
248. See MARIA KARRAS, EMILY MCCARRON, ABIGAIL GRAY & SAM ARDASIlNSKI,
ON THE EDGE OF JUSTICE: THE LEGAL NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH A MENTAL ILLNESS IN
NSW 116 (2006), http://xml.lawfoundation.net.au/ljftsite/articlelDs/CB05FD97AAF2458C
CA25718E00014293/$file/EdgeOfJustice.pdf (directing attorneys to ask questions to find
out whether the client suffers from a mental illness).
However, service providers referred to ways in which lawyers can attempt to ascertain
whether a person has a mental illness. For example, a case manager suggested that if a
legal service provider suspects a client may have a mental illness, they could attempt
to encourage the client to disclose their illness. Id. (footnote omitted).
249. See id. (providing suggestions for how to ask a client about the client's mental
condition).
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has had any mental problems in the past, or if he or she has any family
history of mental disabilities.25° In addition, attorneys should also ask
clients about any medications they may be taking, if they are in therapy
or if they experienced any recent emotional or behavioral changes.25'
Attorneys should also ask questions to the defendant's family members
and friends.252 Counsel's association with family members and friends
can also help an attorney build a rapport with the client.253 More impor-
tantly, family members can be a good source of information because they
can help defense counsel determine the "accuracy, completeness and ve-
racity of the details provided to counsel by the client., 254 In Brownlee,
two sisters presented crucial testimony about the defendant's mental
health problems.255 Unlike the psychologist who only met the defendant
shortly before testing, the defendant's sisters were able to provide the
court with information about the defendant's lifelong struggle with
mental illness. 6
Furthermore, as a part of gathering information, counsel should also
obtain information including police records,257 "social security, disability
250. 27 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2008) (offering an outline for counsel to utilize when
gathering information for a case involving a mentally ill defendant). "If the client has
experienced mental problems in the past, information regarding them may be relevant to
the case at hand." Id. In addition, it is often possible to find multiple instances of an
illness within the same immediate family. Id.
251. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008).
252. See id. at 129 (asserting that family members may give a better understanding to
the psychological status of the client).
253. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) ("This connection with fam-
ily will assist counsel in building rapport with the client.").
254. Id. ("The defense lawyer should attempt to discern the accuracy and complete-
ness of the information conveyed by the client."). "If possible, it is helpful to verify details
provided by the client with information supplied by a supportive family member or infor-
mation gathered by the social work staff of the public defender's office." Id.
255. See Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1053 (commenting on how the sisters testified that
their brother, the defendant, had seizures when he was around twenty years old and would
try to hurt himself which "included forcing family members out of the apartment and
harming himself by jumping out the window and cutting himself in the chest").
256. Id. at 1052 (detailing how the trial court told defense counsel before the second
sentencing phase to contact a psychologist named Dr. William Beidleman). It is evident
that the defense counsel only contacted the psychologist after the court told them, only a
short period of time before the second sentencing trial. Id.
257. See State Bar of Texas, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69
TEX. B. J. 966, 980 (2006) ("Habeas corpus counsel must attempt to obtain evidence and
information in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities, including
police reports .... "); see also COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'T, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL
HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT 75 (2002), http://consensusproject.org/downloads/En-
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records, past psychiatric records addressing inpatient treatment, and cur-
rent jail medical and psychiatric records," substance abuse treatment
records and academic records. 58 With regard to mental retardation, ac-
cessing pregnancy records, birth records, pediatric records, and hospital
records can help in establishing any abnormalities in the defendant's
health.259 These documents could also show when the onset of symptoms
began so that the attorney can prove that the onset of mental retardation
symptoms started before the age of eighteen. 260 Gathering these docu-
ments can help prepare counsel for court as well as prevent them from
missing crucial information like the defense counsel did in Shanklin.2 6 1
Shanklin illustrates the importance of obtaining documentation because
the entire problem in Shanklin could have been averted had the attorneys
tirereport.pdf (stating that it is important for an attorney to find important information
about a client including police records).
One of the first actions of defense counsel after appointment should be to identify
those clients with severe mental illness. This can be done by interviewing the defen-
dant, and reviewing the police report and the information obtained by the pretrial
services program. At least one state, Georgia, has a statute that allows defense attor-
neys access to state mental health records with the consent of the client. It can also be
done by listening to family members or others who may be in a position to provide
useful information about the mental health status of the client. Id.
258. John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007).
When the client's competence or mental stability is in doubt, the attorney should at-
tempt to gather information including social security disability records, past psychiat-
ric records addressing inpatient treatment, and current jail medical and psychiatric
records. Substance abuse assessment and treatment records are another source of in-
formation, as well as information from family members and academic records that
highlight a history of learning disabilities. Id.
259. See Victor R. Scarano & Bryan A. Liang, Mental Retardation and Criminal Jus-
tice: Atkins, the Mentally Retarded, and Psychiatric Methods for the Criminal Defense At-
torney, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 285, 304 (2004) (detailing how pregnancy, birth,
and pediatric records can help attorneys determine if their client is mentally retarded).
Pregnancy records can show prenatal difficulties, whether the mother was on drugs or alco-
hol during the pregnancy, and whether she suffered any traumas or illnesses during preg-
nancy. Id. Birth records could provide information on the baby's health during the post-
delivery period. Id. Pediatric records could show how the child grew and developed and
"any congenital anomalies or abnormalities." Id.
260. See American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, Fre-
quently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability and the AAIDD Definition, http://
www.aamr.org/media/PDFs/AAIDDFAQonID.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (stating that
the onset of mental retardation must occur before the individual turns eighteen years old).
It follows that since prenatal, birth and pediatric records are each created while a person is
a child, that these documents could possibly show the development of mental retardation
in an individual while under eighteen years old.
261. See People, 814 N.E.2d at 143 (describing how counsel failed to obtain a pre-
sentence report indicating the defendant's mental illness and retardation).
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investigated and found the pre-sentence report indicating that the defen-
dant had mental illness and retardation.262 In addition, defense attorneys
should also obtain family histories and statements from family members
regarding the defendant's mental health.263 Had the attorneys in
Brownlee discussed the defendant's mental health problems with his sis-
ters it is likely that counsel would have been alerted to his mental health
problems and not have failed to investigate and present that evidence
during the sentencing phase of trial.2 6
While imperative, gathering information will probably be difficult and
will require patience on the part of counsel. Attorneys must accept that
gathering evidence does not have a definitive stopping point because they
should monitor their client's competence carefully throughout the rela-
tionship. 65 Attorneys must also prepare themselves for the difficulty in
obtaining information because their mentally disabled clients may utilize
the cloak of competency to hide their disability and might not be forth-
coming with information.266 This is particularly the case with mentally
retarded capital defendants who are likely to have learned to compensate
for their inability to understand by acting tough.26 7 Therefore, it is all the
more important when gathering information from defendants that de-
fense counsel remember the phenomena of the cloak of competency as
262. See id. (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a pre-sentence
report that would have indicated the defendant's mental health problem).
263. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) (stating that attorneys should
talk to family members as part of their investigation into their client's mental disability);
see also George S. Baroff, Capital Cases, 22 CHAMPION 33, 33 (1998) ("Therefore, defense
lawyers must be alert to the possibility of mental retardation and initiate the diagnostic
process by collecting school records and family histories.").
264. See Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1070 (holding counsel ineffective for failing to investi-
gate and find mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's mental health problems). Part
of the mitigating evidence counsel would have investigated would have included talking
with the sisters who could have detailed the defendants troubled history of suffering with
mental retardation. Id.
265. See Thomas K. Byerley, Focus on Professional Responsibility-Representing the
Incompetent or Disabled Client, 77 MICH. B.J. 1320, 1321 (1998) ("Therefore, when faced
with representing a client with a mental disability, the lawyer needs to carefully monitor
the client's competence to make the necessary decisions and must take the appropriate
corrective action when the lawyer discovers this disability.").
266. See State Bar of Texas, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69
TEX. B. J. 966, 971 (2006) (stating that a "client will generally attempt to 'mask' such condi-
tion" as mental retardation). While this is a recommendation from the Texas State Bar, it
is still good form for attorneys to remember this no matter what state they are in.
267. See Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for
the Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REv.
701, 712 (2008) ("[C]apital clients may have learned to compensate for a lack of under-
standing by acting tough.").
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well as realize that the anger or behavioral problems their client exhibits
likely means that the defendant is exhibiting a lack of understanding.268
C. Use Experts
Counsel should use experts as often as possible because doing so can
yield important benefits to the attorney individually. The first benefit is
that experts can screen defendants for mental health issues.2 69 Second,
by using experts, attorneys can better avoid the effects of the cloak of
competency. 7 ° Third, counsel can utilize experts to help them communi-
cate the best course of legal action.271
Not only is it important for counsel to use experts for their benefit,
they must also utilize experts in the courtroom setting to present evidence
on the defendant's mental status as often as possible. If counsel fails to
present expert testimony on the defendant's mental disability, they may
be found ineffective as the attorneys in Thomason and Jells were.272
While using experts can be expensive, as noted in Thomason, attorneys
should work with the mental health professionals to discover ways to re-
duce the costs. 273
Additionally, before employing experts, attorneys should become fa-
miliar with the state statutes regarding the use of experts because some
states require using certain qualifications of experts. For example, many
states require that the psychologist be licensed.274 Some states require
268. See id. ("The capital defender should be aware that the client is exhibiting a lack
of understanding, not just anger.").
269. See, e.g., Ex parte Van Alstyne, 239 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (stat-
ing that the American Bar Association recognizes "the important role of experts in screen-
ing defendants for mental health issues, including mental retardation").
270. See id. 822-23 ("There is a reason that mental-health experts are important to
this process; mildly mentally retarded individuals often learn to disguise their disabilities in
a so-called 'cloak of competence."').
271. JOHN W. PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABIrTY Law, Evidence and
Testimony: A Comprehensive Reference Manual for Lawyers, Judges and Mental Disabil-
ity Professionals 43 (ABA Pub. 2007) (stating that experts can help counsel examine the
client and can advise counsel on how to best communicate with the client). "Clients who
appear to be somewhat limited either intellectually or in their abilities to function may be
persons with mental retardation. A lawyer should try to confirm this fact through discus-
sions with the client, inquiries to family members and friends, or medical and social service
records." Id.
272. See Head, 578 S.E.2d at 428 (finding counsel ineffective for failing to use expert
evidence of defendant's mental disability); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 494 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to use a mitigation specialist).
273. See Head, 578 S.E. 2d at 428 (concluding that the attorney should have found
ways to work with the mental health expert in reducing the cost).
274. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(b) (1994) (requiring that in a determination
as to whether a defendant is mentally retarded, a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist must
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275that the psychologist be licensed in the state where the court is sitting.
Other states require the use of more than one licensed physician or psy-
chologist in examining a defendant.276
In addition, in order to obtain the best result when using mental health
professionals, counsel should provide the expert with the relevant evi-
dence they have obtained regarding the defendant's background.277 In
Thomason, another one of counsel's failures was failing to give experts
information about the defendant.278 In Thomason, defense counsel knew
of two attorneys who had spent time with the defendant but failed to give
them material regarding the defendant, as they had promised, which in-
cluded school, medical, and institutional records.279 This failure caused
defense counsel to be unable to present the mitigation evidence they had
amassed because they did not know how to present the evidence without
using an expert. 28 ° Additionally, the importance of sharing information
with mental health experts was recognized in a 2002 opinion by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that counsel's failure to use an
independent expert and additionally to not give the court's expert infor-
be used who is qualified and trained to make that assessment); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-2005(a)(2) (West 2008) (requiring that IQ tests for a capital defendant who is po-
tentially mentally retarded be administered by a licensed psychologist).
275. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(F) (2007) (requiring that the
psychologist or psychiatrist who conducts the examination of the defendant be licensed by
the state). "When a defendant makes a claim of mental retardation under this Article, the
state shall have the right to an independent psychological and psychiatric examination of
the defendant. A psychologist conducting such examination must be licensed by the Loui-
siana State Board of Examiners of Psychologists." Id.
276. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623(b) (1994) (requiring that when a court is
determining if a defendant is mentally retarded, the court must order an examination of
the defendant by qualified professionals). "For that purpose, the court shall appoint two
licensed physicians or licensed psychologists, or one of each, qualified by training and prac-
tice to make such examination, to examine the defendant and report their findings in writ-
ing to the judge within 10 days after the order of examination is issued." Id.
277. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) (describing the need for
attorneys to share relevant information regarding a defendant's mental health with quali-
fied experts).
278. Head, 578 S.E.2d at 430 (recognizing how defense counsel failed to provide two
mental health experts necessary information and relevant materials needed to assess the
client's condition).
279. Id. (stating how defense counsel failed to provide a psychiatrist relevant school,
medical, and institutional records, "as well as information about the crime for a forensic
evaluation").
280. Id. (stating that defense counsel did not call any expert to present mitigation
evidence and that defense counsel did not present any mitigating evidence at trial "because
counsel did not know how to do it without an expert.").
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mation, the defense counsel failed in presenting mitigating evidence of
the defendant's possible brain damage and epilepsy.281
D. Request a Competency Evaluation
Finally, and most importantly, counsel should request a competency
evaluation whenever there exists a "good faith doubt about the client's
competence." 282 In Burt v. Uchtman, defense counsel not only had a
"good faith doubt," they had an actual awareness that their defendant
had mental health problems. 283 This awareness should have lead them to
request a competency evaluation, but they failed to do so, leading to the
Seventh Circuit finding counsel ineffective in representing their
defendant.284
Counsel and courts should also request a competency evaluation when
the client asks to present him or herself pro se.28 The American Bar
Association (ABA) recommends that the representation of capital de-
fendants be limited to licensed attorneys, who have "demonstrated a
commitment to providing zealous advocacy and high quality legal repre-
sentation in the defense of capital cases" and who have extensive training
in areas such as "presentation of rebuttal of scientific evidence and devel-
opment in mental health fields and other relevant areas of forensic and
biological science. 7286
281. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 988 (9th Cir. 2002).
By failing to request an independent expert and not giving the court's expert pertinent
information, defense counsel lost the opportunity to share this understanding with the
court in aid of presenting mitigation. Instead, the court heard overwhelmingly aggra-
vating circumstances that contributed directly to the court's decision to impose the
death penalty. This important mental health evidence alters the balance of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances and its absence at sentencing significantly undermines
confidence in the outcome. Id.
282. John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) ("Refer for a competency to
stand trial evaluation whenever the attorney has a 'good faith doubt' about the client's
competence .... ).
283. Burt, 422 F.3d at 567 (stating that the defense counsel had knowledge of informa-
tion outside the scope of the trial court that should have caused them to look into a compe-
tency hearing).
284. Id. at 568 (holding that counsel performed deficiently by not requesting a re-
newed fitness hearing for the defendant).
285. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clientsfrom a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) ("Refer for competency
evaluation when the client has a history of mental illness and wishes to represent himself or
herself pro se.").
286. AM. BAR Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 35 (rev. ed. 2003), http://www.nacdl.org/
sl-docs.nsf/issues/ABADPGuidelines/$FILE/ABA-DPGuidelines2003.pdf (noting that de-
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On March 23, 2008 the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Indiana v. Ed-
wards287, that a mentally ill defendant could be required by the State to
use trial counsel. 288 In that case, the defendant, Edwards, requested to
represent himself but the state trial court did not want to allow him to do
so because it noted that he had severe mental schizophrenia.289 The U.S.
Supreme Court found that the states have a right to insist that mentally ill
defendants use trial counsel and asserted that "[n]o trial can be fair that
leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who
by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the
court."
290
Panetti v. Quarterman is an example of an unfair trial as the result of
allowing a mentally ill defendant to represent himself. In Panetti, defen-
dant, Scott Panetti was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after
he represented himself pro se, and despite evidence of his mental ill-
ness.291 While representing himself, Panetti wore a purple cowboy cos-
tume, 2 rambled incoherently, gestured threateningly at jurors, went into
fense attorneys for capital defendants should have a "license or permission to practice in
the jurisdiction," and have "demonstrate[d] a commitment to providing zealous advocacy
and high quality legal representation in the defense of capital cases and satisfied the train-
ing requirements in Guideline 8.1"). See generally Gabrielle Banks, Murder Suspect Acts
as His Own Lawyer: Rarity in Capital Cases Experts Say, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(PA), Jan. 24, 2008, at B1 (reporting on Mr. Patrick Stollar's decision to legally defend
himself without the help of an attorney in a death penalty case).
The American Bar Association guidelines for taking on a death penalty case, the stan-
dard used by the U.S. Supreme Court and more than 50 states and federal courts,
recommend hiring a licensed attorney with a commitment to "zealous advocacy," oral
advocacy skills, complex negotiations and writing skills, expertise in fingerprinting bal-
listics, forensic pathology and DNA evidence, aptitude in presenting mental health
evidence and trial advocacy skills, including jury selection, cross examination of wit-
nesses, opening statements and closing arguments. Id.
287. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
288. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2379 (2008) (stating the trial court denied
Edward's self-representation request).
289. Id. ("Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted
that Edwards suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that, although it appeared he was
competent to stand trial, he was not competent to defend himself at trial.").
290. Id. at 2387 (citing Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954)) (reflecting on the
need for fairness in trials and that no trial can be fair when a mentally ill defendant repre-
sents himself).
291. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848 (reporting how the defendant Scott Louis Panetti was
"convicted and sentenced to death in a Texas state court"). Panetti was convicted despite
evidence presented in trial court, and his own erratic behavior in trial court that indicated
that he suffered from schizophrenia and severe mental illnesses. Id.
292. See Todd J. Gillman & Diane Jennings, Justices Block Execution of Texas Killer:
Death for Schizophrenic Is Cruel and Unusual, Supreme Court Rules, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 29, 2007, at A12 (reporting on how Panetti wore a purple cowboy costume,
among other idiosyncratic acts while he represented himself).
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trances, nodded off, and tried to subpoena people like Jesus Christ and
John F. Kennedy. 93 After being sentenced to death, Panetti appealed
and his case eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court,29 4 which found
that the state court failed to provide defendant the procedures guaran-
teed by Ford.95 The Supreme Court also found that Panetti's mental
illness should have been considered in determining whether he was com-
petent to be executed.2 96 Upon remand of the case by the Supreme
Court, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas found
Panetti competent to be executed.297 To comply with the spirit of Ed-
wards, which held that a state could require a mentally ill defendant to
use counsel, and to prevent debacles like Panetti, counsel and courts
should raise the issue of a defendant's mental illness so that a state can
require the defendant to use trial counsel.
V. CONCLUSION
Remember the story of Jeffery Lee Wood described earlier and how he
narrowly escaped his execution? Now it is clear why he may have come
so close to the execution chamber. Either his attorneys in his murder
trial did not recognize that he suffered from a mental illness or his attor-
neys did know about his mental illness; either way, they made incompe-
tent decisions that caused them to fail to raise the issue of Wood's mental
illness.2 98 Ultimately, Wood's trial attorneys left him in a precarious
state, subject to execution, even though he is mentally ill. While there is
no guarantee that the court would have found Wood mentally ill and that
he qualified for protections under Ford, he should have at least had the
293. See Ralph Blumenthal, Insanity Issue Lingers as Texas Execution Is Set, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at A12 (reporting on how Scott Panetti acted when he represented
himself). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the main issue in the case
was not whether he was competent to handle his own case, but rather the issue was
whether he was "competent to choose the endeavor." Id.
294. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
295. Id. at 2856 (reciting the protections given by Ford and holding that the state court
did not afford Panetti those protections).
296. Id. at 2862 (holding that Panetti's argument that his severe mental illness should
prevent him from being executed should have been considered). "Petitioner's submission
is that he suffers from a severe, documented mental illness that is the source of gross delu-
sions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to
which he has been sentenced. This argument, we hold, should have been considered." Id.
297. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *37 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 26, 2008) (holding that despite Panetti's mental illness, Panetti had a "factual and
rational understanding of his crime" and his impending death, and is therefore competent
to be executed).
298. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 651 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting that appel-
lant did not make any argument that he was subject to any exclusions, including not mak-
ing an argument that he should be excluded for mental health reasons).
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chance to make that argument at his murder trial. Fortunately for Wood,
now that he has raised the issue, he has a chance to escape the death
penalty if the court finds that he is both mentally ill and unable to com-
prehend the reason for his death sentence.299
For future capital defendants, it is imperative that their counsel avoid
the mistakes that past counselors have made. This Comment illustrated
how there are two primary causes for a defense counsel's failure to ade-
quately represent their mentally ill or mentally retarded client. First,
counsel may fall into the trap of believing their client's use of the cloak of
competency or masking of their disability.3" The mentally ill and men-
tally retarded often try to mask and hide their symptoms so that they can
better cope in today's society.301 While perhaps helping them cope in
society, the defendant's masking or use of the cloak of competency is
detrimental to capital defendants, as they are hiding from their attorneys
the one fact that might save their life. The defendant's masking of symp-
toms is not the only cause of counsel's errors. Defense counsel also make
significant errors in judgment.
Defense counsel make significant errors in judgment in three primary
ways: first, by failing to investigate into the defendant's mental health;
second, by failing to utilize experts; and third by failing to request a com-
petency hearing. In Jells, counsel was found to be ineffective for failing to
conduct an investigation into the capital defendant's history of abuse and
academic difficulties.3 °2 In Brownlee, defense counsel failed to investi-
299. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (explicitly recognizing the unconstitutionality of execut-
ing a person who is so mentally ill or retarded that he cannot comprehend the reasons for
his punishment or the finality of his fate). If Wood is found insane, he must be afforded
the protections in Ford and will be exempt from execution.
300. See Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28
HUM. RTs. 9, 11 (2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer01/fellner.html
(stating how a defendant's use of the cloak of competency can cause defense counsel to fail
to realize that their client is mentally retarded). Defense counsel "see a defendant who is
not manifestly 'crazy,' and they do not grasp the profound yet subtle ways a person with
retardation is limited in his or her capacity to understand the world around him or her and
to act appropriately." Id.
301. See id. (stating how the mentally retarded will go to "great lengths" to try to hide
their disability by using a cloak of competence); see also Andrea Stier & Stephen P. Hin-
shaw, Explicit and Implicit Stigma Against Individuals with Mental Illness, 42 AUSTRAL.
PSYCHOLOGIST 106, 106 (2007) (stating that the mentally ill try to hide their disability to
avoid stigmatization).
302. See Jells, 538 F.3d at 496 (holding that counsel's limited investigation into the
defendant's home mitigating factors such as an unstable childhood and academic difficul-
ties led counsel to be found ineffective). Generally, counsel has discretion whether to util-
ize a mitigation specialist and to determine if further mitigating evidence is unnecessary,
but they have a duty to conduct an investigation into the background prior to mitigation
hearing. Id.
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gate into their capital defendant's low IQ, hallucinations and symptoms
of psychosis; thus, counsel was ultimately found ineffective.3 °3
The second error in judgment, failing to utilize experts, was demon-
strated in Jells and Head v. Thomason. In those cases, the courts placed
the burden on attorneys to find and utilize experts, 30 4 and Head v. Thom-
ason held that counsel must do so even if the court denies further funding
by finding innovative methods to reduce costs of the mental health
expert.3 °5
The third error in judgment, failing to request a competency hearing,
was demonstrated in Shanklin and Burt. In Shanklin, counsel failed to
request a competency hearing despite their knowledge that the defendant
was mentally retarded.3 6 The court found that while the defendant may
have used the cloak of competency to mask his symptoms, counsel was
still ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the defendant's mental re-
tardation.30 7 In Burt, counsel was found ineffective for failing to request
a competency hearing because counsel had notice of the defendant's
mental illness, including the use of anti-depressants, psychotropic drugs,
and being scared of imaginary snakes in his cell.30 8
To avoid falling into the trap of the cloak of competency and making
significant errors in judgment, counsel must first realize that their defen-
dant may be mentally ill or mentally retarded. To make this realization,
counsel should educate themselves on the signs, symptoms and stereo-
types of mental retardation. To learn about the symptoms of mental ill-
ness and retardation, counsel should consult the DSM-IV and the
303. Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1045 (holding that counsel's failure to investigate into any
mitigation evidence of the defendant's mental health problem clearly made counsel
ineffective).
304. See Jells, 538 F.3d at 494 (concluding counsel was ineffective in failing to use a
mitigation expert); Head v. Thomason, 578 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 2003) (concluding that
counsel should have called an expert to be effective).
305. Head, 578 S.E.2d at 430 (requiring counsel to find innovative means to reduce
costs of mental health experts and requiring counsel to present expert testimony).
306. Id. (holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
the defendant's mental retardation).
307. Id. at 144 (holding that defense counsel was ineffective despite the fact that the
court noted the defendant may have been concealing his disability). Again, while the court
did not refer to the defendant's efforts to hide his disability as a "cloak of competence," it
fits that definition because the term "cloak of competence" refers to an individual's efforts
to hide his or her disability. See Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with
Mental Retardation, 28 HUM. R-rs. 9, 11 (2001), available at http:// www.abanet.org/irr/hr/
summer0l/fellner.html (defining the "cloak of competence" as a method used by mentally
retarded to hide their disability).
308. Burt, 422 F.3d at 567 (describing counsel's ineffectiveness in having various
pieces of vital information regarding their client's mental health which should have alerted
them to the need for a new competency hearing).
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AAIDD's definitions. 30 9 In educating themselves about the stereotypes
of mental illnesses, counsel should realize that for both mentally ill and
mentally retarded capital defendants, it will not always be physically ap-
parent that the defendant suffers from one of these conditions. 310 By
learning about this stereotype, defense counsel can be alert to the fact
that they will need to do investigation into their client's history; counsel
will also know to ask questions to their client to elicit answers that may
indicate if he or she has a mental illness or mental retardation.31
Next, defense counsel should gather as much information as possible
about the defendant's history including police reports, medical records,
birth records, pediatric records and hospital records.312 In gathering evi-
dence, counsel should also consult with family members and investigate
about the defendant's possible history of mental retardation or mental
illness.313 Finally, counsel should request a competency hearing when-
309. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (identifying sources useful
to attorneys in researching mental illness). "One of the best sources of information for
identifying and understanding the nature of psychological problems is the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR)." Id.
310. See Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for
the Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
701, 712 (2008) ("Many mistakenly believe that one can merely look at a person and tell
whether he or she is mentally retarded."); see also John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kel-
ley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25,
26 (2007) (warning that the defendant's mental illness "may fluctuate as a function of the
course of illness, a response to treatment attempts and effects of medications, and a reac-
tion to his or her legal situation.").
311. See Sherri Bourg Carter, Representing Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed Cli-
ents in Family Law Practice, 22.3 AM. J. FAM. L. 128, 128 (2008) (stating that taking a client
history can help identify the client's mental illness); see also George S. Baroff, Capital
Cases, 22 CHAMPION 33, 33 (1998) ("Absent physical abnormalities, as in Down syndrome
(mongolism), the only clue to retardation may be apparent 'slowness,' vagueness in com-
municating details, and a seemingly poor understanding of the situation").
312. See State Bar of Texas, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, 69
TEX. B. J. 966, 980 (2006) (stating that a habeas corpus counsel has a duty to obtain infor-
mation from the prosecution as well as law enforcement authorities); see also COUNCIL OF
STATE GOV'T, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT 75 (2002), http://
consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire report.pdf (stating that an attorney should first
find all of the client's information). See also John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley,
How to Deal with Difficult Clients from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26
(2007) (recommending that an attorney should gather "social security disability records,
past psychiatric records addressing inpatient treatment, and current jail, medical and psy-
chiatric records").
313. See John Matthew Fabian & Elizabeth Kelley, How to Deal with Difficult Clients
from a Mental Health Perspective, 31 CHAMPION 25, 26 (2007) (advising that a defense
lawyer should speak with the defendant's family members to obtain information and con-
firm details of the defendant's assertions).
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ever they have a good faith doubt about the defendant's mental health
status and especially when the capital defendant requests to represent
himself or herself without using counsel.314
Overall, counsel has a heavy burden when representing mentally ill and
mentally retarded defendants. And, it is a burden that should not be
taken lightly. It is up to defense counsel to recognize the defendant's
mental health status, conduct an investigation into the defendant's mental
health history and request the vital mental health evaluation that could
save the defendant's life. As evidenced by Jeffery Lee Wood and the
other capital defendants mentioned in this Comment, their lives are liter-
ally in counsel's hands.
314. See id. (recommending that counsel request a competency evaluation when they
reasonably suspect that their client is mentally ill and wants to represent himself or herself
pro se).
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